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INTRODUCTION
In his book Siberia Bound, Minnesota-native Alexander Blakely de-
tails his five years living and working in postcommunist Siberia in the
mid-1990s.' Blakely was motivated to bring capitalism to a place
where it had not existed.2 During Blakely's time in Siberia, he and his
Siberian business partner "Sasha" engaged in numerous en-
t Glen L. Farr Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University.
tt Associate Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. We are grateful to
our colleagues and friends who commented on early versions of this Article at the Law &
Entrepreneurship Retreat, the Law and Society Association Annual Meeting, the Kauffman
Summer Legal Institute, the Searle Center Conference on the Economics and Law of the
Entrepreneur, and workshops at the University of Wisconsin, the Hong Kong Polytechnic
University, and Brigham Young University. Special thanks to Greg Pass, Colin Hill, Steve
Browne, and others for comments at the Cornell Law Review Symposium on Law, Innova-
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I ALEXANDER BLAKELY, SIBERIA BOUND: CHASING THE AMERICAN DREA4M ON RuSSIA'S
WILD FRONTIER Xi-xiv (2002).
2 Id. at xi.
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trepreneurial ventures that included selling cocoa beans, chocolate,
latex gloves, and potatoes.3 Most strikingly for purposes of this Arti-
cle, entrepreneurship in Siberia was largely pursued in the absence of
the rule of law.
Blakely describes routine bribery in his business dealings and
never mentions the law or lawyers except to note their absence. In
one anecdote, Blakely recounts borrowing $20,000 from a local
lender. Sasha presented the lender with a contract, which the lender
slid back across the table to Sasha. Blakely describes what happened
next:
Sasha, still grinning, ripped the paper lengthwise in two, then
ripped the two halves into quarters, then into eighths. . . . I felt
drunk with emotion. In two days, we had sold six tons of chocolate
and borrowed twenty thousand dollars without a single lawyer
charging two hundred dollars an hour to put words on paper to
protect us from any and every eventuality. Even better, there would
be no lawyers to siphon thousands of dollars from us when an un-
foreseen eventuality did occur and a dispute arose, a dispute that
only lawyers profited from.4
Blakely's anecdote resonates with many entrepreneurs who view
lawyers and the law as impediments to business.5 In this Article, how-
ever, we claim that law is not only essential to entrepreneurship in the
obvious ways-honest courts enforce contracts and property rights,
for example-but also on a different, more fundamental level.6 We
contend that law plays an integral part in encouraging entrepreneurs
to create the very opportunities from which they profit. Although
Blakely did not realize it, his opportunities in law-barren Siberia were
limited, and it is telling that he left Siberia after only five years.7 By
contrast, the United States is rich with entrepreneurial opportunities,
3 See id. at 1-9, 103, 144.
4 Id. at 7.
5 See, e.g., Scott Edward Walker, Top 10 Reasons Why Entrepreneurs Hate Lawyers, VEN-
TURE HAcKs (Jan. 14, 2010), http://venturehacks.com/articles/hate-lawyers (stating that
"[l]awyers are often viewed as deal-killers").
6 For a macro look at the emerging field of "law and entrepreneurship," see gener-
ally Darian M. Ibrahim & D. Gordon Smith, Entrepreneurs on Horseback: Reflections on the
Organization ofLaw, 50 Aiuz. L. REV. 71 (2008) (describing "law and entrepreneurship" as a
distinct and important field of study).
7 In the end, although he and Sasha were making money, Blakely admitted that their
business model boiled down to an unappealing proposition: bribing the directors of choc-
olate factories. BLAKELY, supra note 1, at 301. In a study of ten Baltic and Central Euro-
pean countries after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, Tomi Ovaska and
Russell Sobel found that different amounts of "entrepreneurial activity" (measured by the
number of new enterprises and by the number of new patent and trademark applications)
correlated with "credit availability, contract enforcement, low government corruption,
sound monetary policy, high foreign direct investment, and policies (such as low regula-
tions and taxes) that are consistent with giving citizens a high degree of economic free-
dom." Tomi Ovaska & Russell S. Sobel, Entrepreneurship in Post-Socialist Economies, 21 J.
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in part because of the role of our legal system in encouraging entre-
preneurs to create them.8
"Opportunity" is a central concept in entrepreneurship re-
search,9 and this Article explores the relationship between law and
entrepreneurial opportunities. We adopt the widely held view that en-
trepreneurial opportunities are ideas created by entrepreneurs, rather
than resources waiting to be discovered.10 Of course, as with all products
of the imagination," entrepreneurial opportunities draw on existing
resources for inspiration,' 2 and we contend that some legal systems
are better than others at encouraging entrepreneurs to think about
existing resources in new ways. We also contend that when entrepre-
neurs exploit opportunities, the inventory of resources expands and
lays the foundation for the creation of even more entrepreneurial op-
portunities.'3 This "opportunity cycle," represented in the figure be-
low, leads to plentiful and continuous opportunity creation.14
PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 8, 14, 24 (2005). These results are consistent with the notion that law
matters to entrepreneurial activity, as we argue in this Article.
8 See infra Part III.
9 See Jeremy C. Short et al., The Concept of "Opportunity" in Entrepreneurship Research:
Past Accomplishments and Future Challenges, 36 J. MGMT. 40, 41 (2010).
10 See, e.g., Alexander Ardichvili et al., A Theory of Entrepreneurial Opportunity Identifica-
tion and Development, 18 J. Bus. VENTURING 105, 106 (2003) ("While elements of opportuni-
ties may be 'recognized,' opportunities are made, not found.").
11 See Peter G. Klein, Opportunity Discovery, Entrepreneurial Action, and Economic Organi-
zation, 2 STRATEGIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP J. 175, 182 (2008) (preferring to discuss entrepre-
neurs imagining opportunities rather than creating them, but conceding that "[a]t one
level, the distinction between opportunity creation and opportunity imagination seems
semantic").
12 See Connie Marie Gaglio, The Role of Mental Simulations and Counterfactual Thinking
in the Opportunity Identification Process, 28 ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAc. 533, 534
(2004) (illustrating modes of thinking that allow entrepreneurs to identify new
opportunities).
13 This is not a revolutionary claim. Half a century ago, Kenneth Arrow wrote a now-
famous article about learning by doing in which he hypothesized, "it is the very activity of
production which gives rise to problems for which favorable responses are selected over
time." KennethJ. Arrow, The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing, 29 REV. ECON. STUD.
155, 156 (1962). The Harvard Business Review recently referred to the "experience curve"-
the notion that companies "develop competitive advantage [by learning over time] ... to
lower costs, gain efficiencies, and improve products by redesigning and utilizing better
technology"-as one of five "charts that changed the world." Andrea Ovans, Vision State-
ment: The Charts That Changed the World, 89 HARv. BUS. REV. 34, 34 (2011).
14 After creating the opportunity cycle, we discovered Michael Gollin's "innovation
cycle," which also has three stages and resembles the opportunity cycle. See MICHAEL A.
GOLLIN, DRIVING INNOVATION: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGIES FOR A DYNAMIC
WORLD 17-19 (2008). Gollin's cycle begins with "creative work by individuals" using ex-
isting knowledge. Id. at 17. The second stage is "adoption by society," which Gollin also
refers to as "diffusion." Id. at 18. Gollin uses the term "innovation" in a narrow sense,
including only those creative works that are shared. Id. at 17-18. "Personal creative acts"
do not count as innovations. Id. The third stage is "accessibility of knowledge" without
which no cycling of innovation can occur. Id. at 18. A "successful innovation" is one that
"joins the reservoir of accessible knowledge," providing a foundation on which creative
people build in the "next revolution of the innovation cycle." Id. at 19. As is evident from
1535
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Opportunity
Creation
Resources OpportunityExploitation
Legal rules play an important role in the opportunity cycle, and
two sets of stories regarding law are foundational to innovation
research:
-The first is that property rights (i.e., the right to exclude) are
essential in the development of innovative resources because property
rights assure market participants that they can retain many of the benefits
of their success.'5
-The second is that various sets of legal rules-including laws
limiting barriers to entry, bankruptcy laws, and corporate laws relating
to limited liability and asset partitioning-reduce the costs of en-
trepreneurial action and failure, thus emboldening entrepreneurs to ex-
ploit opportunities.16
Our thesis is that these stories are part of a grander tale about the
opportunity cycle and that the central theme of this tale is that pro-
moting entrepreneurial action is a fundamental value of the U.S. legal
system.
Over a half century ago, Willard Hurst offered a similar thesis
with regard to nineteenth-century legal policy in the United States,
observing that "the release of individual creative energy was the domi-
the foregoing description, the innovation cycle is describing a process by which resources
are created. While these resources are essential to the opportunity cycle, the two cycles do
not attempt to explain the same phenomena.
15 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. EcON. REv. 347,
347-49 (1967) (discussing how property rights protect incentives while minimizing
externalities).
16 See, e.g., ENTREPRENEURSHIP, GROWrH, AND INNOVATION: THE DYNAMICS OF FIRMS AND
INDUsTRIEs 246 (Enrico Santarelli ed., 2006) (stating that "limited liability encourages en-
try by providing a kind of wealth insurance for potential risk averse entrepreneurs").
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nant value" of the American legal system.17 Echoing Max Weber18
and anticipating Douglass North,'9 Hernando de Soto,2 0 the "Rule of
Law" scholars, 2 1 the "Legal Origins" theorists, 22 and others,23 Hurst
argued that law provided a stabilizing influence that allowed private
actors to plan for the future.24 Within a "framework of reasonably
predictable consequences," Hurst surmised that private actors were
"likely to cultivate boldness and energy in action."25 In this Article, we
suggest that these values have stayed intact to the present day.
Although we claim as a descriptive matter that promoting en-
trepreneurial action is a fundamental value of the U.S. legal system,
we also recognize circumstances in which this value has largely been
absent from policy debates.26 For example, federal immigration law,27
which has traditionally been motivated by concern for national secur-
17 JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-
CENTURY UNITED STATES 7 (1956); cf John P. Roche, Entrepreneurial Liberty and the Commerce
Power: Expansion, Contraction, and Casuistry in the Age ofEnterprise, 30 U. Cm. L. REV. 680, 680
(1963) (arguing that the "key dogma" of the industrial revolution was entrepreneurial lib-
erty, which amounted to "the notion that what was good for business was good for the
nation").
18 See 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 642-43 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich
eds., Univ. of Cal. Press 1978).
19 See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE 46-53 (1990).
20 See HERNANDO DE SoTo, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN
THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 174-75 (2000).
21 SeeJohn K.M. Ohnesorge, The Rule of Law, 3 ANNUAL REV. L. & Soc. Sci. 99, 107
(2007).
22 See Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LIT.
285, 307-08 (2008).
23 See, e.g., WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON LAw IN COLONIAL AMERICA: VOLUME I,
THE CHESAPEAKE AND NEW ENGLAND, 1607-1660, at 47 (2008) (explaining how law that
developed in Virginia in the 1600s provided investors with "extensive protection"); GABRIEL
KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY,
1900-1916, at 179 (1963) (noting that large businesses favored increasing federal regula-
tion due to their stabilizing effects).
24 HURST, supra note 17, at 10-11 ("[T]he law of private property-the law of the
autonomy of private decision makers-included also positive provision of legal procedures
and tools and legal compulsions to create a framework of reasonable expectations within
which rational decisions could be taken for the future.").
25 Id. at 22.
26 Indeed, some commentators argue that "laws in the United States do more to hin-
der entrepreneurship than assist it." Christine Hurt, The High Cost of Entrepreneurship, CON-
GLOMERATE BLOG: BUSINESS, LAw, ECONOMICS & SOCIETY (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.
theconglomerate.org/2013/01/the-high-cost-of-entrepreneurship.html; see also Eric J.
Gouvin, Of Small Businesses and Entrepreneurs: Toward a Public Policy that Supports New Venture
Formation, in ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND INNOVATION IN EVOLVING ECONOMIES: THE ROLE OF
LAw 27, 29 (Megan M. Carpenter ed., 2012) (arguing that "law frequently . .. erects obsta-
cles to new business formation").
27 Immigration law "refers to the body of law governing the admission and expulsion
of aliens." Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 547 (1990).
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ity,2 labor supply,29 family reunification,30 refugees, 3' and other con-
siderations,32 is only now considering the promotion of
entrepreneurial action as a motivating value. For the past decade, the
focal point of these policy debates has been the H-1B visa, which is of
particular importance to technology firms because it allows temporary
or nonimmigrant workers in occupations requiring "a body of highly
specialized knowledge" to work for a sponsoring employer in the
United States for up to three years.3 More recently, however, the dis-
cussion of links between immigration and entrepreneurship has ex-
28 Congress regulates immigration law under the "plenary power" doctrine, which has
its origins in the so-called Chinese Exclusion Case. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S.
581 (1889). The plenary power doctrine was justified in that case by reference to national
security considerations. See id. at 604 ("While under our Constitution and form of govern-
ment the great mass of local matters is controlled by local authorities, the United States, in
their relation to foreign countries and their subjects or citizens are one nation, invested
with powers which belong to independent nations, the exercise of which can be invoked
for the maintenance of its absolute independence and security throughout its entire terri-
tory."). Despite criticism, see, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of
Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 Sup. CT. REv. 255, 255 (1984) ("[T]he Court should aban-
don the special deference it has accorded Congress in the field of immigration."), the
Supreme Court of the United States continues to invoke the plenary power doctrine. See
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012) ("The Government of the United
States has broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of
aliens."). National security remains one of the driving forces of immigration law. Matthew
J. Lindsay, Immigration, Sovereignty, and the Constitution ofForeignness, 45 CONN. L. REv. 743,
749 (2013) (arguing that "the association between immigration regulation and national
security remains essential to justifying a power unmoored from the Constitution and
shielded from judicial scrutiny").
29 See, e.g., Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, sec. 101,
§ 274A, 100 Stat. 3359, 3360 (codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a) (2012)) ("[m]aking employ-
ment of unauthorized aliens unlawful"). For an argument that protectionist immigration
policy is harmful to the economy, see Howard F. Chang, Liberalized Immigration as Free
Trade: Economic Welfare and the Optimal Immigration Policy, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 1147, 1153
(1997) (arguing that "the application of trade principles to immigration law suggests ...
that specific liberalizing reforms ... would raise national economic welfare as well as global
economic welfare").
30 See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163
§§ 201(b) (2) (A) (i), 203(a), (d) (1952) (codified in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b) (2) (A) (i),
1153(a), (d) (2012)). For a recent discussion of the policy of family reunification, see
Jessica Feinberg, The Plus One Policy: An Autonomous Model of Family Reunification, 11 NEV.
L.J. 629, 630 (2011) (proposing "adding a new category to immigration law's current fam-
ily reunification scheme, with the aim of providing U.S. citizens and those with whom they
share important relationships significant relief from the harsh results that often arise
under the current system").
31 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (2012) (permitting the Secretary of Homeland Security
or the Attorney General to grant asylum to an alien who is a "refugee" within the meaning
of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)).
32 See Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Policy from Scratch: The Universal and the
Unique, 21 Wm. & MARY BIu RTs. J. 339, 355 (2012) (referring to family reunification,
labor immigration, and refugees as the "three main pillars" of immigration policy, but also
acknowledging other considerations).
33 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1)(A) (2012). For a summary of the issues, see Craig S. Mor-
ford, Note, H to B or Not to Be: What Gives Foreigners the Right to Come Here and Create American
jobs?, 6 OHIO ST. EN'TREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 299, 299-303 (2011).
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panded,3 4 including the promotion of the "StartUp Visa Act"3 5 and
the launch of "Entrepreneur Pathways" in November 2012 by the U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), a resource developed
"to enhance communications with the entrepreneurial community
and provide foreign entrepreneurs with the tools and information to
determine which nonimmigrant visa category is most appropriate for
their particular circumstance."3 6 While we acknowledge that other
values are important in creating, interpreting, and enforcing laws, we
believe as a normative matter that the promotion of entrepreneurial
action is an important value to add to these and other debates.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we begin by reviewing
the existing literature on entrepreneurial opportunities. We recog-
nize that entrepreneurial opportunities have an objective component,
which leads some commentators to assert that entrepreneurial oppor-
tunities are discovered. Nevertheless, we join the vast majority of en-
trepreneurship scholars in concluding that it is the subjective acts of
the entrepreneur that mostly create entrepreneurial opportunities.
In Part II, we examine how entrepreneurs create opportunities
and recognize the sources of novelty or innovation in entrepreneurial
opportunities. We review briefly the vast psychology literature on cre-
ativity and innovation, which holds that new opportunities have their
genesis in existing resources. Relying on the theory of creative cogni-
tion, we maintain that entrepreneurs draw on existing resources, their
life experiences, and other available ideas in using the processes of
analogy, conceptual combination, and abstraction to create en-
trepreneurial opportunities.
In Part III, we argue that a legal system can facilitate the creation
of entrepreneurial opportunities by emboldening entrepreneurs to
act. A legal system encourages entrepreneurial action by assuring en-
trepreneurs that they can retain the benefits of their success while re-
ducing the costs of their failure. Here we draw on Willard Hurst, who
discussed how nineteenth-century legal policy in the United States fa-
34 See, e.g., THE WHITE HOUSE, BUILDING A 21ST CENTURY IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 9 (May
2011) (noting that the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service "has already
begun initial steps to reduce barriers for high-skilled immigrants by identifying and reduc-
ing undue immigration barriers faced by foreign-born entrepreneurs").
35 StartUp Visa Act of 2011, S. 565, 112th Cong. (2011) (proposing to amend the
Immigration and Nationality Act to establish visas for sponsored alien entrepreneurs).
36 Entrepreneur Pathways: A Resource for Immigrant Entrepreneurs, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/eir (last visited Mar. 27,
2013). The Entrepreneurs in Residence (EIR) team created this particular resource. See
Entrepreneurs in Residence (EIR), U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., available at http://wmy.
uscis.gov/eir (last updated May 8, 2013). These initiatives correspond with stagnation in
immigrant-founded startups. See VIVEK WADHWA ET AL., THEN AND Now: AMERICA'S NEW
IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS 2 (Oct. 2012) (finding that "for the first time in decades, the
growth rate of immigrant-founded companies has stagnated, if not declined").
1539
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cilitated the "release of individual creative energy" through transact-
ing.3 7 Encouraging entrepreneurs to act and release their creative
energy results in the pursuit of many ideas, and it is this combination
of acting and having existing ideas to act upon that leads to the devel-
opment of an opportunity cycle that sustains an entrepreneurial
society.
I
ENTREPRENEURIAL OPPORTUNITIES
Entrepreneurship scholars strive to understand the nature and
causes of entrepreneurial action, and the most influential definitions
of entrepreneurship revolve around the concept of opportunities.3 8
For instance, Jonathan Eckhardt and Michael Ciuchta define entre-
preneurship as "the discovery, evaluation, and exploitation of en-
trepreneurial opportunities." 3 9 Scott Shane offers a similar definition:
"[e]ntrepreneurship is an activity that involves the discovery, evalua-
tion and exploitation of opportunities to introduce new goods and
services, ways of organizing, markets, processes, and raw materials
through organizing efforts that previously had not existed."40 As evi-
denced by these definitions, the concept of opportunities plays a central
role in the study of entrepreneurship. 41
Entrepreneurial opportunities are the subset of market opportu-
nities that involve some form of novelty or innovation. 42 Joseph
Schumpeter offers a typology of five forms of entrepreneurial oppor-
tunities: 1) new goods; 2) new methods of production; 3) new geo-
graphical markets; 4) new raw materials; and 5) new ways of
organizing.43 Eckhardt and Ciuchta define entrepreneurial opportu-
37 See HURST, supra note 17.
38 Peter Klein observes that "occupational" and "structural" theories of entrepreneur-
ship focus on the entrepreneurial mindset and the entrepreneurial firm, respectively, pay-
ing little or no attention to entrepreneurial opportunities. Klein, supra note 11, at 176-77.
"Functional" theories of entrepreneurship focus on judgment, innovation, adaptation,
alertness, and coordination. Id. at 177-78. According to Klein, "[w]hat unifies these va-
ried aspects of the entrepreneurial function is the concept of the opportunity." Id. at 179.
39 Jonathan T. Eckhardt & Michael P. Ciuchta, Selected Variation: The Population-Level
Implications of Multistage Selection in Entrepreneurship, 2 STRATEGIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP J. 209,
209 (2008).
40 Scorr SHANE, A GENERAL THEORY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THE INDIVIDUAL-OPPORTU-
NiTy NEXUS 4 (2003) [hereinafter SHANE, GENERAL THEORY] (citation omitted).
41 Jonathan T. Eckhardt & Scott A. Shane, Opportunities and Entrepreneurship, 29 J.
MGMT. 333, 336 (2003) ("[W]e define entrepreneurship as the discovery, evaluation, and
exploitation of future goods and services. This definition suggests that, as a scholarly field,
entrepreneurship involves the study of opportunities." (emphasis added)).
42 For a more in-depth discussion of entrepreneurial opportunities versus market op-
portunities, see Scorr A. SHANE, FOOL'S GOLD? THE TRUTH BEHIND ANGEL INVESTING IN
AMERICA 39-41 (2009) [hereinafter SHANE, FOOL's GOLD?].
43 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMic DEVELOPMENT: AN INQUIRY INTO
PROFITS, CAPITAL, CREDIT, INTEREST, AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE 66 (Redvers Opie trans.,
1540 [Vol. 98:1533
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nities as "situations in which new goods, services, raw materials, mar-
kets, and organizing methods can be introduced for profit."4 4 Shane
and Venkatamaran also focus on the "newness" of entrepreneurial op-
portunities, writing that "[e]ntrepreneurial opportunities differ from
the larger set of all opportunities for profit, particularly opportunities
to enhance the efficiency of existing goods, services, raw materials,
and organizing methods, because the former require the discovery of
new means-ends relationships."4 5
How much newness, novelty, or innovation turns an ordinary
market opportunity into an entrepreneurial opportunity? Entrepre-
neurship often brings to mind novelty in the strong sense, such as a
new technology developed in Silicon Valley and funded by venture
capital. Although Schumpeter wrote several decades before the emer-
gence of Silicon Valley, he appeared to contemplate novelty in the
strong sense. He defined an entrepreneur as someone who carries
out "new combinations"4 6 or as he famously put it, is an agent of "Cre-
ative Destruction."4 7 Schumpeter's entrepreneur is an agitator who
mixes things up by introducing new information into a complacent
Harvard Univ. Press 1961) (1934); see also SHANE, GENERAL THEORY, supra note 40, at 34
(observing that there has been a lack of research on the forms that entrepreneurial oppor-
tunities may take and that only one empirical study has employed Schumpeter's typology
of opportunity); Eckhardt & Shane, supra note 41, at 340 (illustrating Schumpeter's typol-
ogy with examples).
44 Eckhardt & Ciuchta, supra note 39, at 210.
45 Scott Shane & S. Venkataraman, The Promise of Entrepreneurship as a Field of Research,
25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 217, 220 (2000) (emphasis omitted). In 2010, Shane and
Venkataraman were honored with the AMR Decade Award; they each wrote a reflection on
the field of entrepreneurship, giving special attention to entrepreneurial opportunities.
See Scott Shane, Reflections on the 2010 AMR Decade Award: Delivering on the Promise ofEntrepre-
neurship as a Field of Research, 37 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 10, 14-17 (2012) [hereinafter Shane,
Reflections]; Sankaran Venkataraman et al., Reflections on the 2010 AMR Decade Award: Whither
the Promise? Moving Fonard with Entrepreneurship as a Science of the Artificial, 37 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 21, 22-23 (2012) [hereinafter Venkataraman et al., Reflections]. These reflections
prompted further commentary on the subject of entrepreneurial opportunities. See gener-
ally Sharon A. Alvarez & Jay B. Barney, Epistemology, Opportunities, and Entrepreneurship: Com-
ments on Venkataraman et at. (2012) and Shane (2012), 38 AcAD. MGMT. REV. 154 (2013)
(raising issues with both Venkataraman's and Shane's articles); Raghu Garud & Antonio
Paco Giuliani, A Narrative Perspective on Entrepreneurial Opportunities, 38 ACAD. MGMT. REV.
157 (2013) (proposing a "narrative perspective" to address issues that Shane and
Venkataraman do not address). These commentaries, in turn, provoked responses. See
generallyJonathan T. Eckhardt & Scott A. Shane, Response to the Commentaries: The Individual-
Opportunity (IO) Nexus Integrates Objective and Subjective Aspects of Entrepreneurship, 38 AcAD.
MGMT. REV. 160 (2013) (responding to the commentaries on Shane's 2012 article);
Sankaran Venkataraman et al., Of Narratives and Artifacts, 38 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 163, 163
(2013) [hereinafter Venkataraman et al., Narratives] (describing "relationships between
narratives and artifact that could enhance an agenda for researching entrepreneurship" in
response to the Garud and Giuliani article).
46 SCHUMPETER, supra note 43, at 66.
47 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIAUSM, AND DEMOCRACY 83 (Harper &
Brothers 3d ed. 1950) (1942).
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market.48  In today's knowledge economy, opportunities that are
novel in the strong or Schumpeterian sense are particularly valuable.
Still other entrepreneurial opportunities involve novelty in the
weak sense. 4 9 The typical small business owner is often described as
an entrepreneur, and some scholars have argued that opportunities
exploited by small business owners count as entrepreneurial opportu-
nities.50 For example, Scott Shane has stated that "the en-
trepreneurial process can involve a type of innovation that is much
milder [than technological shake-ups], such as placing a restaurant on
a different corner of an intersection from existing restaurants, or us-
ing different recipes or employees in a new restaurant in the same
location as an old one."5 ' Israel Kirzner's writings on entrepreneurial
opportunities are well known and also invoke innovation in the weak
sense;52 even a situation in which a commodity in one market can be
sold for more in another market is considered an entrepreneurial op-
portunity.53 If opportunities involving innovation in the weak sense
are also counted as entrepreneurial, the importance of en-
trepreneurial opportunities to our society and economy is multiplied
many times over.
In developing the concept of opportunities, scholars have de-
bated whether opportunities are objective phenomena waiting to be
discovered by entrepreneurs or whether entrepreneurs subjectively
48 Eckhardt & Shane, supra note 41, at 341.
49 William Baumol distinguishes between "replicative" entrepreneurs and "innovative"
entrepreneurs. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE MICROTHEORY OF INNOVATIVE ENTREPRENEUR-
SHIP 18 (2010).
50 See Scorr A. SHANE, THE ILLUSIONS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THE COSTLY MYTHS THAT
ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS, AND POLICY MAKERS LIvE By41 (2008) [hereinafter SHANE, ILLU-
SIONS] (describing the typical entrepreneur as "a white man in his forties" who is "just
trying to make a living, not trying to build a high-growth business").
51 SHANE, GENERAL THEORY, supra note 40, at 8. But see Robert A. Baron, Opportunity
Recognition as Pattern Recognition: How Entrepreneurs "Connect the Dots" to Identify New Business
Opportunities, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 104, 107 (2006) ("[Tihe focus here is on what have
been described as innovative opportunities-ones that truly break new ground rather than
merely expand or repeat existing business models, such as, for instance, opening a new
Italian restaurant in a neighborhood that does not currently have one.").
52 A fair amount of the existing opportunities literature is devoted to comparing and
contrasting Kirznerian and Schumpeterian opportunities. See, e.g., ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, PER-
CEPTION, OPPORTUNITY, AND PROFIT: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 111
(1979) ("In Schumpeter it appears that the entrepreneur acts to disturb an existing equilib-
rium situation. . . . [I]n our discussion the entrepreneur is seen as the equilibrating
force."); Guido Buenstorf, Creation and Pursuit of Entrepreneurial Opportunities: An Evolution-
ary Economics Perspective, 28 SMALL BUS. ECON. 323, 325 (2007) (comparing Schumpeterian
and Kirznerian entrepreneurs and their different effects on market processes).
53 See Israel M. Kirzner, Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: An
Austrian Approach, 35J. ECON. LIr. 60, 70 (1997) (describing a situation in which the daring
entrepreneur "buys where prices are 'too low' and sells where prices are 'too high'").
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"create" or "imagine" opportunities. 54 Under discovery theory, en-
trepreneurial opportunities may arise from exogenous shocks to the
competitive equilibrium-including changes in technology, changes
in consumer preferences, and political or regulatory changes-or sim-
ply from the limits of the price system.5 5 According to Sharon Alvarez
andJay Barney, "this emphasis on exogenous shocks forming opportu-
nities suggests that discovery theory is predominantly about search-
systematically scanning the environment to discover opportunities to
produce new products or services."56 Thus, Israel Kirzner described
opportunities as being like twenty-dollar bills lying on a beach, simply
waiting to be plucked up by an entrepreneur.5 7
Proponents of discovery theory recognize that this account of en-
trepreneurial opportunities implies that "entrepreneurs who discover
opportunities are significantly different from others in their ability to
either see opportunities or, once they are seen, to exploit these oppor-
tunities."5 8 Kirzner attempts to capture this difference with the con-
cept of "alertness,"59 and some entrepreneurship scholars have
attempted to operationalize this concept.6 0 Peter Klein has argued
that this research program "misses the point" of Kirzner's metaphor of
entrepreneurial alertness: "Kirzner is not making an ontological claim
about the nature of profit opportunities per se-not claiming, in
other words, that opportunities are, in some fundamental sense, ob-
jective-but merely using the concept of objective, exogenously given,
but not yet discovered opportunities as a device for explaining the
tendency of markets to clear."6 1
While we are sympathetic to Klein's reading of Kirzner, the aca-
demic criticism of the objective theory of opportunities and Klrzner's
response to that criticism are instructive. For example, Don Lavoie
criticizes Kirzner's account of entrepreneurship, observing that "acts
of entrepreneurship . . . require efforts of the creative imagination,
skillful judgments of future cost and revenue possibilities, and an abil-
54 For a useful introduction to the debate, see Sharon A. Alvarez & Jay B. Barney,
Discovery and Creation: Alternative Theories of Entrepreneurial Action, 1 STRATEGic ENTREPRE-
NEURSHIP J. 11, 11-12 (2007).
55 See Eckhardt & Shane, supra note 41, at 336-38.
56 Alvarez & Barney, supra note 54, at 13.
57 See ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 15-16 (1973) ("The
entrepreneurial element in the economic behavior of market participants consists ... in
their alertness to previously unnoticed changes in circumstances which may make it possi-
ble to get far more in exchange for whatever they have to offer than was hitherto
possible.").
58 Alvarez & Barney, supra note 54, at 14.
9 KIRZNER, supra note 57, at 67.
60 See Klein, supra note 11, at 179-80 (discussing opportunity identification literature
which "seeks to build a positive research program by operationalizing the concept of
alertness").
61 Id. at 180 (emphasis omitted).
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ity to read the significance of complex social situations."62 Kirzner
conceded that cultural and social detail would be important in the
application of economic theory,63 which is consistent with Klein's view
that "entrepreneurs act based on their beliefs about future gains and
losses, rather than reacting to objective, exogenously given opportuni-
ties for profit."64
Thus, the boundary between discovery theory and creation theory
is rather blurry as both theories seem to admit that entrepreneurial
opportunities are at least partly endogenous to entrepreneurs. 65
While we do not wish to trivialize the objective attributes of en-
trepreneurial opportunities, 6 6 scholars largely agree that en-
trepreneurial opportunities are historically, culturally, and
psychologically contingent. 67
Scott Shane offers an excellent illustration of opportunity crea-
tion-even though he labels it "discovery"-as we understand the con-
cept.6 8 Shane tracked eight entrepreneurial teams who explored a
single MIT technology for a three-dimensional printing process in the
hopes of licensing that technology.69 The eight teams each saw a dif-
ferent application for the patented technology, ranging from architec-
62 Don Lavoie, The Discovery and Interpretation of Profit Opportunities: Culture and the
Kiznerian Entrepreneur, in THE CULTURE OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 33, 44 (Brigitte Berger ed.,
1991).
63 See ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, THE ECONOMIC POINT OF VIEW: AN ESSAY IN THE HISTORY OF
ECONOMIC THOUGHT 146-47 (1960); Israel M. Kirzner, The Alert and Creative Entrepreneur: A
Clarification, 32 SMALL Bus. ECON. 145, 150 (arguing that he was not "in any way denying
the elements of boldness, creativity, and innovativeness that, in the real world, certainly do
characterize entrepreneurial activity").
64 Klein, supra note 11, at 182-83.
65 In creation theory, "opportunities are social constructions that do not exist inde-
pendent of entrepreneur's perceptions." Alvarez & Barney, supra note 54, at 15. Scott
Shane, who refocused the attention of entrepreneurship scholars on opportunities, is per-
haps the most adamant scholar on the objective nature of entrepreneurial opportunities.
See Shane, Reflections, supra note 45, at 15 ("Entrepreneurial opportunities are situations in
which it is possible to recombine resources in a way that generates a profit. Business ideas
are entrepreneurs' interpretation of how to recombine resources in a way that allows pursuit
of that opportunity."). Shane's view that "objective factors influence opportunities" re-
flects precisely our own view. Id. Embracing this idea eliminates the need for a new and
separate concept of "business ideas." See id.
66 See Jeffery S. McMullen et al., What Is Entrepreneurial Opportunity?, 28 SMAL. Bus.
EcoN. 273, 276-78 (2007) (discussing various ways to view the objective component of
opportunities).
67 Peter Klein would concede on this point but would also argue that the subjective
nature of entrepreneurial opportunities and the fact that "we treat them as a black box"
makes them less useful as a unit of analysis. Klein, supra note 11, at 183. He would focus
instead on entrepreneurial action, which he describes as "the assembly of resources in the
present in anticipation of (uncertain) receipts in the future." Id. The opportunity cycle
labels this "opportunity exploitation." See id. at 179.
68 Scott Shane, Prior Knowledge and the Discovery ofEntrpreneuial Opportunities, 11 ORG.
Sci. 448, 448 (2000).
69 Four of the teams actually started new firms to exploit the technology, while four
did not. Id. at 454.
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tural models based on CAD drawings, to a new drug delivery system,
to ceramic filters for power generation.70 These variations show that
the technology was not the opportunity but rather a resource-an ex-
isting idea.71 Each entrepreneurial team then created its own oppor-
tunity based on that resource.72
Guido Buenstorf also illustrates opportunity creation using the
example of special bikes designed by a group of California "hippies"
for their downhill races. An entrepreneur who was not part of this
original group later commercialized the bikes as "mountain bikes."73
Buenstorf's analysis matches our own. He views the hippies' modified
bike as a resource, not an opportunity. The unaffiliated entrepreneur
then discovers the resource, evaluates it, and uses it to create the moun-
tain bike.
What we call the act of creation comes after an entrepreneur dis-
covers and evaluates resources but before an opportunity exists. The
entrepreneur's act of creation is what turns existing resources into
new entrepreneurial opportunities.7 4 In Part III of this Article, we dis-
cuss how legal rules affect the opportunities that entrepreneurs per-
ceive, but first we will examine the entrepreneur's creative process
through existing psychology literature.
II
WHERE Do NEW OPPORTUNITIES COME FROM?
As noted in the preceding Part, the act of opportunity creation is
a cognitive process. Although entrepreneurship literature and psy-
chology literature are not always consistent in describing imagination
or creativity, certain creative processes are generally recognized in
70 Id. at 455 tbl.1.
71 Schumpeter did not make the mistake of conflating entrepreneurship with inven-
tion. He observed that "[a] lthough entrepreneurs of course may be inventors just as they
may be capitalists, they are inventors not by nature of their function but by coincidence
and vice versa." SCHUMPETER, supra note 43, at 88-89.
72 See Shane, supra note 68, at 455-59 (comparing the ability of the eight teams to
recognize and take advantage of opportunities).
73 Buenstorf, supra note 52, at 329-30. Randall Holcombe gives another example:
Xerox developed the use of on-screen windows and the computer mouse, but its lack of
"entrepreneurial insight" allowed Apple and Microsoft to exploit these opportunities. Ran-
dall G. Holcombe, The Origins ofEntrepreneurial Opportunities, 16 REV. AuSTRAN ECON. 25, 28
(2003).
74 Venkataraman describes entrepreneurship in a manner that is strikingly similar to
the opportunity cycle: "[M]ost entrepreneurial opportunities in the world have to be made
through the actions and interactions of stakeholders in the enterprise, using materials and
concepts found in the world. Opportunities are, in fact, artifacts. And their making in-
volves transforming the extant world into new possibilities." Venkataraman et al., Reflections,
supra note 45, at 26.
1545
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:1533
both psychology and entrepreneurship. 75 Further, although theories
about creative cognitive processes vary, they all rely on one basic pre-
mise: new ideas come from some combination, restructuring, or ex-
tension of existing ideas.76
A. The Crucial "Incubation" Stage in the Creative Process
Imagination is a broad field of study covering many different
methods of reconstructing past experiences and images.77 In modem
psychology, this field has been divided into four separate subfields:
consciousness, daydreaming, night dreaming, and creativity.78 Crea-
tivity-defined as "the production of any idea, action, or object that is
new and valued" 79-iS the form of imagination that most closely re-
lates to the creation of entrepreneurial opportunities. Creativity is a
process that has several stages, the most important of which, for our
purposes, is incubation.80 The incubation stage is crucial to our ac-
75 While we focus on the psychology literature, entrepreneurial scholars have offered
explanations for how entrepreneurs either discover existing ideas or create new opportuni-
ties. An entrepreneur who discovers an existing resource before someone else has a
favorable information asymmetry. Entrepreneurs might have superior information or ac-
cess to existing resources due to their current jobs, prior experiences, or social networks.
They may also gain informational advantages through an active search for information.
When no informational asymmetries exist, one entrepreneur may be able to see something
in an existing resource that another does not. These "belief" asymmetries mean that entre-
preneurs are able to evaluate shared information differently during the creative process.
Individual traits such as intelligence, creativity, and alertness can influence an entrepre-
neur's ability to imagine new opportunities from known resources. See, e.g., SHANE, GEN-
ERAL THEORY, supra note 40, at 45 ("[P]eople discover opportunities that others do not
identify for two reasons: first, they have better access to information about the existence of
the opportunity. Second, they are better able than others to recognize opportunities,
given the same amount of information about it, because they have superior cognitive
capabilities.").
76 See e.g., ARTHUR S. REBER ET AL., PENGUIN DicrloNARY OF PSYCHOLOGY 371 (4th ed.
2009) ("Imagination[:] The process of recombining memories of past experiences and
previously formed images into novel constructions"); Denis A. Gregoire et al., Cognitive
Processes of Opportunity Recognition: The Role of Structural Alignment, 21 ORG. Sc. 413, 426
(2010) ("In line with past research, we observe that the executives in our study used their
prior knowledge of markets to search for and think of opportunities for new technolo-
gies."); Brian J. Loasby, Uncertainty and Imagination, Illusion and Order: Shackleian Connec-
tions, 35 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 771, 772 (2011) (focusing on George Shackle's idea that "we
can acquire new knowledge only by connecting it to our existing knowledge[ ]and that the
consequences of such connections are in general not predictable").
77 Imagination, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY 227, 227 (Alan E. Kazdin ed., 2000).
78 Id. at 229.
79 Creativity, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 77, at 337, 338.
80 The other stages are preparation, insight, evaluation, and elaboration. Id. at 339.
This general psychological theory of creativity has been directly applied to opportunity
creation in some cases, with each stage representing a part of the entrepreneurial process.
See Ashford C. Chea, Entrepreneurial Venture Creation: The Application ofPattern Identification
Theory to the Entrepreneurial Opportunity-Identiication Process, INT'LJ. Bus. & MGaMT. 37, 43-45
(2008).
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count of the connection between law and entrepreneurial
opportunities.
Incubation is the unconscious process whereby the brain com-
bines ideas with information stored in memory at random and
whereby the individual either accepts or rejects these combinations of
ideas with the information stored in memory.81 Though it is unknown
exactly how this happens, there are several theories about the process,
including the theory of creative cognition, which will be discussed be-
low. An individual cannot engage in the incubation process without
becoming immersed in and curious about an unresolved problem, but
after the individual has these two prerequisites, the incubation process
can occur without the conscious knowledge of the creative thinker. 2
Psychologists and cognitive scientists have devised several theories
to describe the process through which the brain creates new ideas.
One theory that has gained substantial support both in the psychology
and entrepreneurship literatures is the theory of creative cognition.83
Although there are different branches within this theory that have cre-
ated separate versions of cognitive processes,84 the core of the theory
accepts the notion that there are at least three processes by which an
individual creates new ideas: analogy, conceptual combination, and
abstraction. 5 Like other psychological theories of imagination, this
theory relies on the premise that new ideas come from existing
ideas.86
To take each part of the theory of creative cognition in turn, anal-
ogy is the process of transposing a conceptual structure from a habit-
ual context to an innovative context; this is like using the structure of
a planetary system to visualize the orbit of electrons around an atom.87
Combination is the concept of combining old ideas in new ways, such
as combining the different structures of elements to create the double
helix for DNA mapping.8 8 Abstraction is "the discovery of any struc-
ture, regularity, pattern, or organization that is present in a number of
81 See Creativity, supra note 79, at 339.
82 Id.
83 See generally RONALD A. FINKE ET AL., CREATIVE COGNITION: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND
APPLICATIONS (1992) (discussing cognitive processes from a psychological perspective);
Thomas B. Ward, Cognition, Creativity, and Entrepreneurship, 19 J. Bus. VENTURING 173
(2004) (discussing cognitive approaches to creativity as they relate to entrepreneurs' gen-
eration of ideas for business ventures).
84 See Ward, supra note 83, at 181.
85 Id. at 176-85; see also Hans Welling, Four Mental Operations in Creative Cognition: The
Importance of Abstraction, 19 CREATIVIY REs. J. 163, 168-74 (2007) (discussing analogy, con-
ceptual combination, and abstraction theories in turn).
86 See Ward, supra note 83, at 176.
87 See Welling, supra note 85, at 168-69.
88 Id. at 169 ("Combination is the merging of two or more concepts into one new
idea.").
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different perceptions that can be either physical or mental in
nature."89
Although creative cognition has found some application to entre-
preneurship, other theories apply more specifically to explain the pro-
cess of creating or recognizing entrepreneurial opportunities. One
such theory claims that entrepreneurs engage in the process of struc-
tural alignment in order to create new ideas for opportunities.9 0
Structural alignment is a theory that cognitive scientists created to ex-
plain analogies and analogical thinking,9' and it is a theory that is
referenced frequently in the field of creative cognition as well.9 2
Structural alignment involves comparing abstract relationships and ca-
pabilities of a certain technology or object with technological fields or
domains that are familiar to the entrepreneur.93 This allows the en-
trepreneur to process the new information and create new ideas for
exploiting the technology.94
The concepts that underlie the structural alignment theory fit
well with both the theory of creative cognition and the general psy-
chological theory of creativity. In essence, structural alignment is an
amalgamation of the processes of abstraction and analogy under the
creative cognition theory. The entrepreneur discovers structures and
patterns associated with an object (engages in the process of abstrac-
tion) and then analogizes that new information with more familiar
information the entrepreneur has stored about market places and
other domains. Under the general psychological theory of creativity,
this process would fall under the phase of incubation, as it is an un-
conscious cognitive process.
B. The Other Stages in the Creative Process
Although less critical to our connection between law and oppor-
tunities, the other stages in the creative process are also important
and reveal that entrepreneurs draw on existing ideas to create new
opportunities. These other stages in the creative process, discussed
below, are preparation, insight, evaluation, and elaboration.
Preparation is the process whereby the individual becomes im-
mersed in the "symbolic system, or domain" of a particular branch of
technology.95 For example, painters often become familiar with the
89 Id. at 170.
90 See Gregoire et al., supra note 76, at 415-16.
91 See generally Dedre Gentner, Structure-Mapping: A Theoretical Framework for Analogy,
7 COGNITIVE Sc. 155 (1983) (discussing structure-mapping as a framework that describes
the rules of analogies and analogical thinking).
92 See e.g., FINKE ET AL., supra note 83, at 22-23; Ward, supra note 83, at 180.
93 See Grgoire et al., supra note 76, at 416.
94 Id.
95 Creativity, supra note 79, at 339.
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works of art of other painters, and writers read the works of other
writers.96 Also included in the preparation stage is a sense of curiosity
about some unresolved problem in the particular branch of technol-
ogy.97 Unresolved problems may either be presented to the creative
thinker or discovered by the thinker who is dealing with problematic
situations.98 In short, the preparation stage is where an entrepreneur
discovers an existing idea. Using the examples from earlier in this
Article, preparation is where Buenstorf's entrepreneur discovers the
downhill bike or Shane's entrepreneurs discover the MIT
technology.99
Insight is the moment of illumination that occurs when a combi-
nation of ideas is "strong enough to withstand . .. unconscious censor-
ship."100 Because this experience is often so strong, it is usually the
experience that creative thinkers focus on to the exclusion of the pre-
ceding and succeeding processes.' 01 However, psychologists consider
the other processes to be more important to the creative process in
general.102
Evaluation is the process whereby the creative thinker seeks to
reconcile the new combination of ideas with the existing ideas within
the domain of the branch of technology. 03 Many idea combinations
fail in this process because although the idea may be novel, it is not
completely consistent either with logic or with the field in which the
creative thinker is working. 04 At this stage, the creative thinker can
err either on the side of being too concerned with having a perfect
theory or not being concerned enough.105
Finally, elaboration is the process whereby the idea is tested and
applied.106 This is the end of the creative process and produces the
final opportunity. For example, after the novelist has come up with
the idea for a brilliant book, he or she must now sit down, write the
book, and take it through the editing process.107 This is another stage
in which the opportunity may fail because it is a stage that requires
time and hard work. 08 In sum, new opportunities come from existing
96 See id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
100 Creativity, supra note 79, at 339.
101 See id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 339-40.
107 See id.
108 Id.
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ideas, and our brief review of the psychology literature helps explain
the process.
III
THE OPPORTUNITY CYCLE
Several years ago, one of the authors was visiting an indoor chil-
dren's play park with a colleague in Germany. While observing their
children at play, the German lawyer offered several suggestions about
how the play park might be improved, and he speculated that the bus-
iness would be much more successful if the owners of the play park
adopted his innovative ideas. His companion, impressed by the law-
yer's ingenuity, wondered aloud if he might be tempted to leave his
legal practice to build a more advanced play park. The German law-
yer was puzzled. Why would he leave his prestigious professional position to
become an entrepreneur? In his view, entrepreneurship was for people
who could not succeed in loftier intellectual pursuits.
As we consider why people might create and exploit en-
trepreneurial opportunities, we would do well to remember two
points illustrated by this anecdote. First, entrepreneurship has a cul-
tural dimension that may be (mostly) independent of legal and mar-
ket incentives. Second, people think creatively even when they have
no intention of profiting from their innovative ideas. Nevertheless,
incentives matter. 09 In this section, we argue that legal rules en-
courage the creation of entrepreneurial opportunities by assuring
market participants that they can retain many of the benefits of their
success while reducing costs associated with transacting, especially
when the transactions fail. As discussed in more detail below, scholars
in various areas of law have linked law and entrepreneurial action.
We seek to generalize these insights arguing simply that when law em-
boldens action, entrepreneurs create more opportunities.
A. Motivating the Release of Energy
When Willard Hurst published Law and the Conditions ofFreedom in
1956, he was striving to debunk the image of the nineteenth-century
United States as a laissez-faire society, 110 but Hurst's claim that Ameri-
109 Cf Russell S. Sobel et al., Freedom, Barriers to Entry, Entrepreneurship, and Economic
Progress, 20 REv. AusRIAN ECON. 221, 222 (2007) ("In countries with institutions providing
secure property rights, a fair and balanced judicial system, contract enforcement, and ef-
fective limits on government's ability to transfer wealth through taxation and regulation,
creative individuals are more likely to engage in the creation of new wealth through pro-
ductive private sector entrepreneurship.").
110 Huas-r, supra note 17, at 32 ("Belief in the release of private individual and group
energies thus furnished one of the working principles which give the coherence of charac-
ter to our early nineteenth-century public policy. This principle found expression in no
simple removal of legal restrictions or staying of the regulatory hand. Limitations on offi-
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can law promoted the "release of individual creative energy" as an in-
dependent value is a tantalizing suggestion."' Under this view,
legislatures and courts defined private property to protect the auton-
omy of an individual vis-i-vis the state, created legal rules to ensure
the enforcement of valid contracts, and imposed tort liability to en-
courage people to rely on others." 2 Legal forms, including the cor-
poration, "loaned the organized force of the community to private
planners." 13
Hurst builds his story on two rather mundane observations about
the operation of law in nineteenth-century America. First, the institu-
tion of private property-comprising not only the rules relating to
ownership that are typically associated with property law, but also the
rules against injury that are associated with criminal law and tort law-
ensured autonomy for private decision makers as against the public
officials, as well as against other private parties.114 Second, the willing-
ness of courts to enforce promises allowed property owners to plan for
the use of their property in the future.115 When combined, these ob-
servations direct our eyes toward the importance of transactions as the
source of energy.1 6 Hurst was not interested in the solitary inventor
or the reclusive author. The "release of individual creative energy"
was accomplished through collaborative business ventures, and Hurst
was interested in the entrepreneur.17
The Hurstian entrepreneur was inspired to action by the prospect
of material gain. The state's role was to secure property rights and
reduce the risks associated with venturing." 8 The legal framework,
therefore, served as a form of subsidy for business transactions.' 19
The common law rules examined by Hurst were largely agnostic about
cial power were very important elements of this pattern of policy. But so, too, was a compli-
cated affirmative use of law to furnish instruments and procedures and to impose as well as
enforce patterns of dealing. In this aspect, our nineteenth-century policy involved a good
deal less of simple laissez faire than has often been claimed for it.").
1 Id. at 7.
112 See id. at 8-9.
113 Id. at 11.
114 Id. at 9.
115 Id. at 12.
116 Id. at 14 ("[T]he general extension of contract expressed, above all else, the in-
creasing dominance of the market in social organization.").
117 Cf SCHUMPETER, supra note 43, at 74 ("The carrying out of new combinations we
call 'enterprise'; the individuals whose function it is to carry them out we call
'entrepreneurs.'").
118 See HURsT, supra note 17, at 19-20.
119 Id. at 11 ("[E]nforcement of promises involved delegating the public force in aid of
private decision making.").
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the substance of transactions. 120 The motivation of legal policy mak-
ers was not efficiency or fairness,I21 but action.122
In the modern regulatory state, legal rules are more complex and
intrusive than those studied by Hurst, but the bias for action still in-
heres in much of our current legal policy. In the following sections,
we describe two roles that the legal system performs in facilitating the
creation of entrepreneurial opportunities: ensuring that entrepre-
neurs retain the benefits of their success and reducing the costs of
action and even failure. We do not attempt to give a comprehensive
account of the U.S. legal system; 123 instead, we offer various examples
of laws that illustrate the central point of our Article, that the promo-
120 Id. at 14 ("In more and more instances, from mid-century on, the law itself pro-
vided a framework for the parties' dealing, unless they explicitly contracted out of the
transaction which the rules of law shaped for them. This was notably true in respect to the
instruments of commerce . .. . [, but] [t]his development was a particularly important
form of the more general, growing confidence of the courts in implying agreements from
the parties' dealings and construing their agreements in the light of trade custom.").
121 See generally Louis KAPLOw & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 3-4 (2002)
(arguing that "legal rules should be selected entirely with respect to their effects on the
well-being of individuals in society").
122 The foundation for this legal policy may have been laid in the near aftermath of
the American Revolution. As observed by Gordon Wood:
[N]o banks, no government, no institutions could have created the Ameri-
can economic miracle of [the early nineteenth century] . . . America sud-
denly emerged a prosperous, scrambling, enterprising society not because
the Constitution was created or because a few leaders formed a national
bank, but because ordinary people, hundreds of thousands of them, began
working harder to make money and 'get ahead.' Americans seemed to be a
people totally absorbed in the individual pursuit of money.
GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 325 (1991).
123 For example, we do not discuss tax policy. For an excellent and brief summary of
the arguments relating to the effect of tax subsidies on entrepreneurship, see Victor
Fleischer, Taxing Founders' Stock, 59 UCLA L. REv. 60, 92-97 (2011) (arguing that the "ef-
fect of the tax subsidy is mostly inframarginal, rewarding entrepreneurs for activity they
would have conducted anyway"). We could also have discussed capital formation which
has been in the news recently with the passage of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act
(JOBS Act), Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012). For an excellent examination of the
role of capital formation in entrepreneurship, see Elizabeth Pollman, Information Issues on
Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 185-86 (2012). In a contribution to this symposium,
Robert Thompson and Donald Langevoort argue that regulation of the public offering
process is motivated by "concern for the sales pressures that come from having to dispose
of a significant volume of securities in a short time and the risks of deception and opportu-
nism that may result." Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-
Private Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REv. 1573, 1627 (2013).
As the authors recognize, however, efforts to control fraud through regulation affect the
cost of capital formation. Id. at 1618. Thus, as with other legal rules discussed in this
Article, the debate over capital formation for entrepreneurial firms is about the optimal
level of regulation. For an empirical investigation of the effect of securities regulation on
the creation of new entrepreneurial ventures, see Douglas Cumming & April Knill, Disclo-
sure, Venture Capital and Entrepreneurial Spawning, 43 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 563, 564 (2012)
(suggesting that stricter disclosure standards for venture capital investments would en-
courage "entrepreneurial spawning").
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tion of entrepreneurial action is a fundamental value in the U.S. legal
system.
B. Retaining the Benefits of Success
As noted by Hurst, one of the basic requirements for entrepre-
neurship is the right to own private property.124 Property theorists are
quick to observe that "property" is not a thing,12 5 but rather a "bundle
of rights" with respect to a thing.'2 6 The tricky part of defining "prop-
erty" is that the bundle of rights is not the same for all things.12 7 As a
result, the designation of something as "property" does not say any-
thing about the associated rights.128 Thus, the label "property" has
come to be seen by some as "almost meaningless."129 Fortunately, we
are not interested in the legal definition of property but rather in the
economic understanding of property rights. For many economists
(and lawyers, as it turns out), the essence of "property" is the right to
exclude. 30 We use "property rights" in this sense to motivate our dis-
cussion of law and entrepreneurial opportunities.
The right to exclude is pervasive. As Shyamkrishna Balganesh
has observed, "[t] he idea of exclusion, in one form or the other, tends
to inform almost any understanding of property, whether private, pub-
lic, or community."'3 1 The right to exclude from a resource implies
124 See HURST, supra note 17, at 10-11.
125 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Econom-
ics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 358 (2001) (stating, tongue-in-cheek, that "[s]omeone who believes
that property is a right to a thing is assumed to suffer from a childlike lack of sophistica-
tion-or worse").
126 See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REv. 357, 361
(1954); Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12 (1927) [hereinaf-
ter Cohen, Sovereignty] (using the term "set of relationships" in place of "bundle of rights");
Jeremy Waldron, What Is Private Property?, 5 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 313, 314-15 (1985)
(discussing the difficulty of defining contents of the "bundle of rights" for any property).
127 See Waldron, supra note 126, at 315 (noting that if the bundle of rights "remained
constant for all or most of the cases that we want to describe as private property, the bun-
dle as a whole could be defined in terms of its contents" but that "it does not remain
constant, and that is where the difficulties begin"),
128 SeeJoan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IowA L. REv. 277, 297 (1998) ("Label-
ing something as property does not predetermine what rights an owner does or does not
have in it.").
129 Merrill & Smith, supra note 125, at 357.
130 SeeJ.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAw 68 (1997) (contending that "prop-
erty rights can be fully explained using the concepts of exclusion and use"); 2 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND 2 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1979) (1766)
(defining property as "that sole and despotic dominion . . . exercise[d] over the external
things . .. in total exclusion of the right of any other" (emphasis added)); see also Cohen,
Sovereignty, supra note 126, at 12 (noting that "the essence of private property is always the
right to exclude others"); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L.
REv. 730, 730 (1998) (stating that "the right to exclude others is more than just 'one of the
most essential' constituents of property-it is the sine qua non").
131 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability,
and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 593, 596 (2008).
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the correlative duty not to interfere with the resource.13 2 Thus, the
right to exclude becomes the touchstone for describing a broad swath
of legal rules that protect one person's resources from infringement
by another.
This expansive understanding of the right to exclude also under-
girds our view that a fundamental purpose of law in connection with
entrepreneurship is to define rights to exclude. 33 As observed by
Kirsten and Nicolai Foss, rights to exclude are inextricably linked to
the creation of entrepreneurial opportunities: "[P]roperty rights steer
the entrepreneurial discovery process. . . . [I]f the entrepreneur can-
not hold (sufficiently) secure property rights to certain resource at-
tributes, he will not explore these and certain resource attributes may
therefore never be discovered and explored." 34
Multiple entrepreneurs might be interested in creating similar
opportunities from the same underlying resources, but not all of them
have the legal right to do so. Faced with competing claims to oppor-
tunities, the law allocates resources between competing entrepre-
neurs. It does so through the granting of property rights, which
allows the grantee to create and exploit the opportunity while at the
same time excluding others from doing so.135 Some of the entrepre-
neurship literature recognizes that property rights are important to
opportunities, 1- 6 and we explain this connection using a traditional
example-patent law-and a less obvious one-corporate fiduciary
law-as illustrations. '37
132 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied injudi-
cial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 35-36 (1913).
133 Steven N. S. Cheung, The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive
Resource, 13J. L. & EcoN. 49, 67 (1970) ("The transfer of property rights among individual
owners through contracting in the marketplace requires that the rights be exclusive....
[WIithout some enforced or policed exclusivity to a right of action, the right to contract so
as to exchange is absent.").
134 Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss, Entrepreneurship, Transaction Costs, and Resource Attrib-
utes 5 (Ctr. for Strategic Mgmt. & Globalization, Working Paper No. 7, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=982103. We do not intend to suggest that all entitlements are
potential opportunities, but rather than all opportunities depend on legal entitlements.
135 See supra notes 124-32 and accompanying text.
136 See Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss, Understanding Opportunity Discovery and Sustainable
Advantage: The Role of Transaction Costs and Property Rights, 2 STRATEGIc ENTREPRENEURSHIPJ.
191, 194 (2008).
137 Other areas of potential inquiry relating to property rights are the law of agency
and the law of employment contracts, particularly as they relate to competition by an agent
with a principal or former principal. Ronald Gilson has famously argued that refusing to
enforce covenants not to compete-effectively refusing employers the right to exclude-is
facilitative of entrepreneurial activity. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High
Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 575, 608-09 (1999). For an argument in favor of a uniform rule of unenforceabil-
ity that is partly motivated by a desire for more innovation, see Viva R Moffat, Making Non-
Competes Unenforceable, 54 ARIz. L. REv. 939, 984 (2012) ("[A] number of recent studies
indicate that a legal regime in which non-competes are unenforceable is preferable not
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1. Patent Law
The legal rules governing the issuance and exploitation of pat-
ents define resources through the granting of property rights.138 Al-
though Willard Hurst did not examine patent law in Law and the
Conditions of Freedom,139 the "democratization" of patents in the nine-
teenth century seems to have played an important role in the eco-
nomic development of the United States.140 Patent law is the most
conspicuous example of the promotion of entrepreneurial action as a
fundamental value of the U.S. legal system. 141
just for employees (which goes without saying), but also for employers who will gain from
access to more skilled and qualified employees and from increased overall innovation and
financial returns.").
138 Intellectual property has traditionally been classified as outside the realm of legal
property. See Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter
Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law ? 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 365, 365 (1989).
Nevertheless, a patent is a right to exclude, earned by the patentee through disclosure. See
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) (disclosure is
the "quid pro quo of the right to exclude" (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416
U.S. 470, 484 (1974))). For a debate on "intellectual property isolationism," see Mark A.
Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1031, 1075 (2005)
("The economics of intellectual property law should focus on the economic characteristics
of intellectual property rights, not on inapposite economic analysis borrowed from the very
different case of land.") and John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property Isolationalism and the Average
Cost Thesis, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1077, 1078 (2005) ("A unified theory of property-one broad
enough to account for the similarities and differences among species of property as diverse
as Blackacre and patents-promises to increase rather than to diminish our understanding
of property and intellectual property." (emphasis omitted)).
139 See HURST, supra note 17; Oskar Liivak, Maturing Patent Theory from Industrial Policy to
Intellectual Property, 86 TUL. L. REv. 1163, 1181 (2012) (asking if the release of "individual
creative energy" could "extend to patents as well" as traditional property).
140 See, e.g., B. ZORINA KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION: PATENTS AND COPY-
RIGHTS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1790-1920, at 107 (2005) ("The U.S. patent
system was instrumental in directing the efforts of a diverse array of individuals toward
extracting returns from their improvements."); Petra Moser, How Do Patent Laws Influence
Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century World's Fairs, 95 Am. ECON. REV. 1214, 1233
(2005) (noting that "the decision to adopt strong patent laws at the beginning of the nine-
teenth century may have played an important role in encouraging the American focus on
manufacturing machinery that spurred economic growth toward the end of the century").
141 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REv. 1575,1576
(2003) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers] ("Patent law is our primary policy tool to
promote innovation, encourage the development of new technologies, and increase the
fund of human knowledge."); see also Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L.
REV. 1315, 1326 (2011) ("The core mission of patent law is to create incentives for the
production, disclosure, and commercialization of socially valuable inventions."). This goal
emanates from the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution: "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8.
Michael Burstein is skeptical of the need for intellectual property to facilitate informa-
tion exchange. See Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information Without Intellectual Property,
91 TEX. L. REV. 227, 247 (2012) (arguing that a "nuanced understanding of information
supports a range of potential strategies for engaging in exchange, of which intellectual
property is only one"). Given the potentially high costs of obtaining patent protection, he
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As illustrated earlier in Scott Shane's study of three-dimensional
printing, the innovations embodied in patents are not themselves en-
trepreneurial opportunities but rather resources that can be em-
ployed in the creation of entrepreneurial opportunities. 14 2 Based on
our understanding of the process of opportunity creation described
above, we assume that expanding the inventory of resources would
naturally lead to the creation of more entrepreneurial opportunities.
Thus, we view the ultimate purpose of patent law as the promotion of
entrepreneurial action.
How should the patent system maximize the inventory of socially
valuable inventions? While scholars largely "agree on the goals the
patent statute is intended to achieve[,] they have offered radically dif-
ferent ideas for interpreting patent law to achieve those goals."' 4 3
The scope of debate regarding patent law is vast because
the legal rules defining patent protection must account for a
fundamental trade-off: as protection is strengthened, the incentive
to innovate is heightened ex ante, but the costs of monopoly
are increased ex post. 144  Thus, the attributes determining
patent protection-including novelty,1 4 5 utility, 14 6 non-obvious-
contends that the case for broadening and strengthening intellectual property rights is
weaker than many commentators assume. Id. at 275.
142 Shane, supra note 68, at 467.
143 Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 141, at 1578.
144 See WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL
TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 76 (1969). See also Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking
Novelty in Patent Law, 60 DuKE L.J. 919, 920-21 (2011) ("The U.S. patent system is a pendu-
lum. It swings back and forth, attempting to balance the need to reward inventors for their
work against the need to foster innovation through the dissemination of technical
knowledge.").
145 The novelty requirement is codified in 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) ("Whoever invents
or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter
... may obtain a patent. . . ."). Tun-Jen Chiang offers an interesting explanation for the
connection between the novelty requirement and the promotion of entrepreneurial ac-
tion. Tun-Jen Chiang, Defining Patent Scope by the Novelty of the Idea, 89 WASH. U. L. REV.
1211, 1267 (2012) ("[T]he core purpose of patent law is to protect against misappropria-
tion of information goods, and this means the idea and not the embodiment."). For an
argument that the current method of interpreting novelty can have a negative effect on
innovation, see Seymore, supra note 144, at 926.
146 The utility requirement is based on the Intellectual Property Clause of the Consti-
tution, which gives Congress the power to grant exclusive rights to inventors to "promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The requirement is
also codified in 35 U.S.C. § 101 ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent . . . ."). The U. S. Supreme Court has articulated the policy
connecting the utility requirement and the promotion of entrepreneurial action: "The ba-
sic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent
monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with substantial utility.
Unless and until a process is refined and developed to this point-where specific benefit
exists in currently available form-there is insufficientjustification for permitting an appli-
cant to engross what may prove to be a broad field." Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519,
534-35 (1966). Interpreting this passage, Sivaramjani Thambisetty has argued that "the
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ness,14 7 subject matter,148  and scopel 49-have generated intense
scholarly debate. We do not attempt to resolve these debates about
patent law here, but we highlight the debates to show that both the
current legal rules and the reform proposals recognize the promotion
of entrepreneurial action as the dominant value in patent law.150
criterion of utility appears to function as a timing device in gauging when an invention on
the assembly line of scientific enquiry is ready to be patented." Sivaramjani Thambisetty,
Legal Transplants in Patent Law: Why "Utility" Is the New "Industrial Applicability," 49
JURIMETRICSJ. 155, 173 (2009).
147 The non-obviousness requirement is codified in 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006 & Supp.
V 2011) ("A patent may not be obtained ... if the differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in
the art to which said subject matter pertains."). Michael Abramowicz and John Duffy de-
scribe the theoretical connection between the non-obviousness requirement and the pro-
motion of entrepreneurial action. Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement
Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1594 (2011) ("[I]f the innovation would be
created and disclosed even without patent protection, denying a patent on the innovation
costs society nothing (because the innovation would be developed anyway) and saves soci-
ety from needlessly suffering the well-known negative consequences of patents, including
the restriction on output caused by a patentee's exclusive rights and the administrative and
litigation costs associated with running a patent system."). Although Abramowicz and
Duffy would rely on the non-obviousness requirement to advance the goals of patent law,
most courts and commentators agree with Ed Kitch that the non-obviousness requirement
is an "awkward" tool "to sort out those innovations that would not be developed absent a
patent system." Edmund W. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents,
1966 Sup. CT. REv. 293, 301.
148 Patent eligibility is determined initially by reference to 35 U.S.C. § 101 ("Whoever
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject
to the conditions and requirements of this title."). The United States Supreme Court has
created three exceptions to the broad patent-eligibility principles in section 101: "laws of
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas." Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,
309 (1980). The subject matter requirement is notoriously uncertain, and this uncertainty
can impede innovation. See Michael Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REv. 591,
646 (2008).
149 The scope of a patent is determined by the claims that "define what the inventor
considers to be the scope of her invention, the technological territory she claims is hers to
control by suing for infringement." Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex
Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 839, 844 (1990). The connection between the
scope of patents and the promotion of entrepreneurial action entails consideration of the
fundamental trade-off in patent law discussed above. Merges and Nelson add that scope
determinations have an important effect on future substitutes. Id. at 870 ("Since some of
the follow-on efforts of inventors could result in something not simply slightly different but
significantly better than the patented technology, broad patents could discourage much
useful research."). The usual answer to this concern is Kitch's prospect theory. See Ed-
mund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20J.L. & ECON. 265, 266 (1977).
For an analysis of scope as a "levels of abstraction problem," see Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels
of Abstraction Problem in Patent Law, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 1097, 1100 (2011).
150 Even when a patent law scholar argues that intellectual property may be trivial, the
focus is on innovation incentives. SeeJonathan M. Barnett, Is Intellectual Property Trivial?,
157 U. PA. L. REv. 1691, 1692 (2009).
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Similarly, recent debates about the so-called "patent crisis"-in-
cluding discussions of business method patents,15 1 the role of patent
institutions (the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit and the United States Patent and Trademark Office),152 and pat-
ent trolls' 53-revolve almost exclusively around the issue of
innovation. A striking manifestation of our thesis in this literature
comes from the work of Dan Burk and Mark Lemley, who describe the
current patent system as comprising "unitary" patent rules that are
sometimes tailored to the needs of different industries by courts.' 54
The impulse to adapt the rules of patent law to different industries
emanates from a desire to more efficiently promote innovation.15 5 To
achieve that goal, Burk and Lemley advocate a "modular patent sys-
tem," which would be created through the use of "existing policy
levers" such as the utility requirement or the PHOISTA standard
("person having ordinary skill in the art") ,156 and the development of
"nascent policy levers" such as the presumption of validity and patent
misuse claims.' 5 7 As with the debates about patent law doctrines dis-
151 The United States permits business method patents, at least insofar as they are
more than "abstract ideas." Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225, 3229 (2010). John
Duffy has argued that in the development of business method patents, "law followed tech-
nology,"John F. Duffy, Why Business Method Patents?, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1247, 1263 (2011), as
one would expect in a legal system that encourages entrepreneurial experimentation.
152 See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTs: How OUR
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM Is ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO Do
ABOUT IT 107-10, 179-81 (2004).
153 Colleen Chien has studied the effect of patent trolls on start-up firms. See generally
Colleen V. Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls (Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research Pa-
per No. 09-12, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
2146251 (concluding that small firms are vulnerable as targets of nuisance lawsuits because
they use technology and often pay settlements without regard to the merits of the claim).
For other takes, see also John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat
Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 707-08 (2011) (detailing findings that patent trolls tend
to fail in court); Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and
Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1577 (2009) (calling
patent trolls "perhaps the most controversial and least popular group of patent plaintiffs");
Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1811 (2007) (comparing patent trolls to the "patent sharks" of
the nineteenth century); Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REv. 457, 458
(2012) (asserting that "the patents enforced by so-called trolls-and the companies that
obtained them-look a lot like other litigated patents and their owners").
154 DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND How COURTS CAN SOLVE
IT 5 (2009) [hereinafter BURK & LEMLEY, PATENT CRISIs]; see also Burk & Lemley, Policy
Levers, supra note 141, at 1577 ("[A]lthough patent law is technology-neutral in theory, it is
technology-specific in application."); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technol-
ogy-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1156 (2002) (describing the "increasing diver-
gence between the rules [of patent law] and the application of the rules to different
industries").
155 BURK & LEMLEY, PATENT CRISIs, supra note 154, at 4 (stating that the "entire pur-
pose" of patent law is to "promote innovation").
156 Id. at 109-30.
157 Id. at 131-41.
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cussed above, the analysis shows that both current legal rules and re-
form proposals strive to promote entrepreneurial action.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the two contributions to this symposium
relating to patent law propose complementary reforms that would
promote entrepreneurial action by undermining patent trolls.'5 8
John Duffy argues that the goals of patent law are expressed errone-
ously in a manner that enables patent trolling.15 9 According to Duffy,
the "public benefit" sought from patenting "can easily be viewed as
including not merely the disclosure required by the statute to be set
forth in the patent document but also the benefit flowing from the
practical knowledge and experience gained from actually building
and commercializing the invention."160 Duffy proposes a "resurrec-
tion of the paper patent doctrine,"161 which would favor the commer-
cialization of inventions. Similarly, Oskar Liivak and Eduardo
Pefialver would limit the right not to use patents: "[U]nless the holder
of the patent is actually practicing the invention, remedies for patent
infringement against independent inventors should be significantly
softer than they would be in other successful patent infringement ac-
tions, possibly even de minimis."1 62 While one could argue that plac-
ing additional constraints on patenting is contrary to the "release of
energy" described by Hurst, the thrust of both of these papers is to
promote entrepreneurial action.
2. Fiduciary Law
Fiduciary law arises within many substantive areas of law. For pur-
poses of this discussion, we focus on one subspecies of fiduciary law,
the opportunities doctrine, which is a subset of corporate law's duty of
loyalty. The opportunities doctrine allows fiduciaries-for example,
officers and directors-of corporations or other business entities-to
exploit those opportunities that courts do not deem to belong to the
entity.163 In the typical case, a third party might approach the fiduci-
158 SeeJohn F. Duffy, Reviving the Paper Patent Doctrine, 98 CORNELL L. REv. 1359, 1396
(2013) (arguing that the revival of the paper patent doctrine could alleviate the current
concerns about patent trolls); Oskar Liivak & Eduardo M. Pefialver, The Right Not to Use in
Property and Patent Law, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1437, 1442-43 (2013) (arguing that treating
patents more like traditional types of property could aid patent reform).
159 See Duffy, supra note 158, at 1388-89 (noting that patent law's focus on disclosure
of inventions has enabled patents to issue to those who did not actually develop any
technology).
160 Id. at 1361-62.
161 Id. at 1396. Duffy describes the essence of the doctrine as follows: "[D]ocumentary
disclosure was sufficient to sustain the validity of a patent, but the courts favored inventors
who had done more." Id. at 1374.
162 Liivak & Pefialver, supra note 158, at 1443.
163 See ROBERT CHARLES CIAR, CORPORATE LAw 224-25 (1986) ("[T]he difficult issue
is to determine what should be deemed, as between the corporation and fiduciary, to be-
long to the corporation, and why."); D. GORDON SMITH & CYNTHIA A. WILLIAMS, BUSINESS
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ary with an opportunity for profit. In one leading case, Guth v. Loft,
Inc.,16 4 it was the opportunity to buy the Pepsi trademark and secret
formula out of bankruptcy in the early 1930s. In another leading case,
Broz v. Cellular Information Systems, Inc.,'6 5 it was the opportunity to buy
a regional cell phone license for an area in Michigan. The fiduciary is
presented with a dilemma: Can he simply purchase and exploit the
opportunity through a separate company, perhaps a start-up, and reap
all of the profits, or does his status as a fiduciary mean that he must
offer the opportunity to his employer?
The corporate opportunities doctrine answers this question, al-
beit imperfectly. 6 6 In distinguishing between acceptable en-
trepreneurial behavior and fiduciary obligation, the corporate
opportunities doctrine promotes entrepreneurial action where it is
appropriate.167 Without the opportunities doctrine, the fear of acting
as a disloyal fiduciary could chill entrepreneurial action. The corpo-
rate opportunities doctrine promotes entrepreneurial action by tell-
ing fiduciaries which opportunities they can create and exploit on
their own and conversely, which opportunities must yield to fiduciary
duty. 68
How does the opportunities doctrine draw this dividing line? As
in the case of patent law, the opportunities doctrine fulfills this func-
tion through the granting of rights to exclude. Although the opportu-
nities doctrine does not grant property rights that allow the grantee to
exclude the rest of the world from the opportunity, it allocates oppor-
tunities between the corporation and fiduciary, leaving third parties
free to exploit the opportunity until either the corporation or fiduci-
ary establishes property rights that allow it to exclude more broadly.169
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES, PROBLEMS, AND CASE STUDIES 515 (2004) (stating that the question
of "whose opportunity is it?" is the "most difficult aspect of the corporate opportunity doc-
trine"); D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REv.
1399, 1483 n.359 (2002) ("The most difficult issue in [the opportunities doctrine] area is
deciding which opportunities belong to the corporation.").
164 5 A.2d 503, 505-06 (Del. 1939).
165 673 A.2d 148, 150 (Del. 1996).
166 See Eric Talley, Turning Servile Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the Corporate
Opportunities Doctrine, 108 YALE L.J. 277, 280 (1998) (referring to the opportunities doctrine
as a "doctrinal quagmire").
167 Cf SMITH & WILLIAMS, supra note 163, at 513 (noting that a plaintiff may prevail on
a corporate opportunities claim only if the opportunity taken by the fiduciary was a "corpo-
rate opportunity").
168 Cf Talley, supra note 166, at 279 (stating that the corporate opportunities doctrine
is "the law's attempt to regulate circumstances in which a corporate officer or director may
usurp new business prospects for her own account").
169 As Dean Robert Clark explains, "the opportunity need not be corporate property in
the strong sense that the corporation could legally object to its being taken and developed
by independent third parties. The point is only that, as between the corporation and its
fiduciary, the opportunity belongs to the corporation [or fiduciary]." CLAR, supra note
163, at 224.
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The corporate opportunities doctrine thus serves to tell fiduciaries
when they can retain the benefits of their own success.
There are a number of tests that courts may choose in defining
corporate versus fiduciary opportunities, each drawing the line in a
different place. Consider two leading tests: (1) the test favored in Del-
aware, the state of incorporation for over half of public companies, is
the line-of-business test, which asks whether the opportunity is part of a
business in which the business entity currently engages or which is a
logical and natural adaptation of that business;1 70 and (2) the interest
or expectancy test, which allocates to the entity only those opportunities
in which it has a recognizable interest or expectancy-for example,
those opportunities on which the entity has a contractual option.171
These leading tests give some guidance and strictures to the dividing
line between corporate and fiduciary opportunities and in doing so
promote entrepreneurial action where appropriate.
Other tests less often used by courts include the "fairness" test,
which asks whether it is fair, all things considered, to allow the fiduci-
ary to exploit the opportunity individually,172 and the "Miller two-step"
test-named after the case that created it173-which layers the fairness
test on top of the line-of-business test. Under the Miller two-step test,
if an opportunity is within the entity's line of business, the fiduciary
might still be permitted to exploit it if fair for him to do so.17 4 These
tests, both of which defer to the nebulous concept of "fairness" with-
out really telling us what that means, have been less successful for a
reason-they do not promote entrepreneurial action because they are
foggy in their definition of corporate versus fiduciary opportunities.
As Eric Talley observes, "U]urisdictions adopting [the fairness] test
170 See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 514 (Del. 1939). Delaware is not the only state to
use this test; rather, "the line-of-business test (or a close variant) has now become preemi-
nent." Talley, supra note 166, at 289. In addition to the basic line-of-business test, these
cases are also decided by looking at certain factors, including whether the fiduciary
learned of the opportunity in his individual or corporate capacity, whether the corporation
was financially able to exploit the opportunity, and whether the third party refused to deal
with the corporation. See CLARK, supra note 163, at 224.
171 The classic case that presents this test is Lagarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co., 28 So.
199, 201 (Ala. 1900).
172 See Durfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc., 80 N.E.2d 522, 529 (Mass. 1948) (stating that
"the true basis of the governing doctrine rests fundamentally on the unfairness in the par-
ticular circumstances" of the fiduciary taking the opportunity). Needless to say, this has
not proved to be the easiest test for courts to apply.
173 Miller v. Miller, 222 N.W.2d 71, 81-82 (Minn. 1974).
174 See id. The American Law Institute (ALI) has developed yet another test, one that
requires fiduciaries to disclose corporate opportunities in advance but allows fiduciaries to
take the opportunity should the entity reject it. See THE Am. LAw INsT., 1 PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 5.05 (1994). Under the ALI test, entity opportunities include
opportunities that are "closely related to a business in which the [entity] is engaged or
expects to engage," which appears similar to the line-of-business test. Id. at § 5.05 (b) (2).
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have had little success in articulating-beyond recapitulations of cir-
cular rhetoric-the substantive contours of a fairness approach."175
Finally, the opportunities doctrine's legal allocation of en-
trepreneurial opportunities through the granting of rights to exclude
has another important effect on entrepreneurial behavior: it moti-
vates entrepreneurs to frame opportunities in a manner that will en-
sure a favorable legal allocation. In doing so, the opportunities
doctrine plays a role in shaping the entrepreneur's creative process.
C. Reducing the Risks of Venturing
The previous section explored one means by which the U.S. legal
system entices entrepreneurs to release their creative energy-by al-
lowing them to retain the benefits of success-but the reality is that
many, or even most, entrepreneurs fail.176 Therefore, if we want en-
trepreneurs to exploit entrepreneurial opportunities, we must also re-
duce the costs of their failure. We first observe that enticing
entrepreneurs to exploit opportunities is not just about limiting the
downside in the case of failure ex post but also about reducing the
barriers to entry ex ante so entrepreneurs can set about on a path of
action in the first place. Second, we discuss what happens if there is
this action but it results in failure. We start with barriers to entry, then
move to bankruptcy laws, which allow entrepreneurs to discharge
debts and have a "fresh start." Finally, we explain how limited liability
and its corollary, asset partitioning, allow entrepreneurs to limit the
costs of failure to the business at hand.
1. Barriers to Entry
In the most recent Doing Business report of The World Bank, the
United States ranked fourth in the world in terms of "ease of doing
business." 77 This ranking includes multiple measures of the ease of
entry into business, including the procedures, cost, minimum capital,
and number of days required to form a business. 17s While the regula-
tion of business entry could function as quality control,179 regulation
might also serve incumbent firms or politicians at the expense of con-
175 Talley, supra note 166, at 293.
176 Cf SHANE, FOOL's GOLD?, supra note 42, at 6 (stating that the frequently heard
success stories of angel investors are "the rarest of rare events").
177 THE WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINEss 2013: SMARTER REGULATIONS FOR SMALL AND
MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISEs 203 (2013). The three countries ranked ahead of the United
States are Singapore, Hong Kong, and New Zealand. See id. at 3.
178 See id. at 56.
179 See, e.g., Benito Arrufiada, Pitfalls to Avoid When Measuring Institutions: Is Doing Busi-
ness Damaging Business?, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 729, 744-45 (2007) (arguing for a "value strat-
egy" that would emphasize the value of information produced by the registration process,
rather than merely the costs of that process).
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sumers and innovation. 80 As one would expect, lowering barriers to
entry increases business formation. 181 In the United States, entry bar-
riers of the sort described above are relatively low, 18 2 and business for-
mation is robust in comparison with other countries. 83
The Doing Business reports were inspired by a series of articles on
law and finance,' 84 which developed into Legal Origins Theory. 185 Al-
though Legal Origins Theory has various potential implications, we
reference it here for the fundamental proposition that "law matters"
to economic development in a fairly specific way, namely in facilitat-
180 See Simeon Djankov et al., The Regulation ofEntry, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1, 5 (2002) (find-
ing that "countries with more open access to political power, greater constraints on the
executive, and greater political rights have less burdensome regulation of entry-even con-
trolling for per capita income-than do the countries with less representative, less limited,
and less free government").
181 See, e.g., Miriam Bruhn, License to Sell: The Effect of Business Registration Reform on
Entrepreneurial Activity in Mexico, 93 REv. ECON. & STAT. 382, 382 (2011) (performing a
statistical analysis and finding that simplifying entry regulation "increased the number of
registered businesses by 5% in eligible industries").
182 Economists sometimes measure this attribute of national economics through an
economic freedom index. The most influential index was developed by James Gwartney,
Robert Lawson, and Joshua Hall, who update the data annually. SeeJames Gwartney et al.,
Economic Freedom of the World Data, FRASER INST., http://www.freetheworld.com/datasets_
efw.html (last updated Oct. 23, 2012). "Economic freedom" is said to have four key ingre-
dients, one of which is "freedom to enter and compete in markets." JAMES GWARTNEY ET
AL., ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2012). This feature of
economic freedom is captured by the part of the index dealing with regulation of business
activities (5C), and the United States ranks 30th of 144 countries. See id. at 7, 14.
The Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street journal developed the Index of Economic
Freedom in 1995. See Edwin J. Feulner, Preface, 2013 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM (Nov.
2012), http://www.heritage.org/index/book/preface. One feature of the index is "busi-
ness freedom," which is described as "an individual's right to establish and run an enter-
prise without undue interference from the state." Terry Miller & Anthony B. Kim, Defining
Economic Freedom, in 2013 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM, http://www.heritage.org/index/
book/chapter-7 (last visited Apr. 4, 2013). The authors also observe that "[b]urdensome
and redundant regulations are the most common barriers to the free conduct of en-
trepreneurial activity." Id. The Index of Economic Freedom draws data from the Doing
Business reports, so it is not surprising that the United States fares well, earning a business
freedom score of 90.5 on a 100-point scale. See Explore the Data, 2013 INDEX OF ECONOMIC
FREEDOM, http://www.heritage.org/index/explore (last visited Apr. 4, 2013); Methodology,
2013 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM, http://www.heritage.org/index/book/methodology
(last visited Apr. 4, 2013).
183 In terms of the number of businesses created in a given year, the United States is
the leader. Compare OFFICE OF AovocAcv, U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., BUSINESS DYNAMICS STA-
TisTics: FIRMS AND ESTABLISHMENTS BY FIRM AGE, available at http://www.sba.gov/advocacy/
849/12162 (reporting that 394,632 new businesses were established in 2010), with New
Businesses Registered, WORLD BANK http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.BUS.NREG
(displaying figures for other countries in 2009, with only the United Kingdom and Brazil
eclipsing 300,000). Looking at the number of workers who are starting their own busi-
nesses as a percentage of the total population, however, the United States falls behind
other, smaller countries. See SHANE, ILLUSIONS, supra note 50, at 18.
184 See Ralf Michaels, Comparative Law by Numbers? Legal Origins Thesis, Doing Business
Reports, and the Silence of Traditional Comparative Law, 57 AM. J. Comp. L. 765, 771-72 (2009).
185 See La Porta et al., supra note 22, at 306-09 (describing Legal Origins Theory).
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ing transactions by limiting barriers to entry.186 Though legal scholars
have been skeptical of the importance of legal origins as an explana-
tory variable,18 7 they have embraced efforts to reduce barriers to entry
when this would encourage entrepreneurship.188 The challenge
when dealing with barriers to entry is to determine when they are im-
pediments to entrepreneurship and when they are facilitative of entre-
preneurship or some other value.
Barriers to entry take many forms, including the sorts of property
rights described in the prior section, and these barriers to entry often
have dual effects. For example, patents create a barrier to entry that
may harm new entrants 89 but may also have the salutary effect of en-
suring product differentiation.' 90 Joshua Wright offers another exam-
ple by describing the tension between antitrust law, which encourages
new products on the ground that they increase consumer choice, and
the "new behavioral approach" to consumer protection law, which
holds that "rules and regulations can be designed to improve consum-
ers' decision-making abilities by altering the design of some consumer
credit products, by restricting consumers' access to others, and by in-
stituting default rules in favor of standardized products" approved by
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. 19'
186 The idea that "law is essential to economic development has a long and venerable
history." Curtis J. Milhaupt, Beyond Legal Origin: Rethinking Law's Relationship to the Econ-
omy-Implications for Policy, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 831, 831 (2009). Nevertheless, the earliest
claim made by Legal Origins Theory-that increases in shareholder protection would lead
to stock market development-has been questioned by using longitudinal data. SeeJohn
Armour et al., Law and Financial Development: What We Are Learning from Time-Series Evidence,
2009 BYU L. REv. 1435, 1484 (noting the "absence of a correlation between corporate law
reform and stock market development").
187 For critical appraisals of Legal Origins Theory by law professors, see generally Ruth
V. Aguilera & Cynthia A. Williams, "Law and Finance": Inaccurate, Incomplete, and Important,
2009 BYU L. REv. 1413, and Michaels, supra note 184.
188 See, e.g., Katharina Pistor, Rethinking the "Law and Finance" Paradigm, 2009 BYU L.
REV. 1647, 1657 (noting that "the underlying thrust" of legal origin-based arguments "ap-
pears to be that entrepreneurship is best left to its own devices and that the regulation of
entry imposes unnecessary and socially harmful costs on business").
189 See, e.g., Kelce Wilson, The Four Phases of Patent Usage, 40 CAP. U. L. REv. 679, 684
(2012) ("Rather than helping to compensate for barriers to entry, the patent system may
actually create a significant barrier. When small, a manufacturer is likely to be tightly con-
strained by an investment-phase budget and is unable to afford litigation-related expenses.
Thus, new entrants are particularly vulnerable to nuisance assertions that leverage litiga-
tion risk asymmetry to drain precious operating capital." (citations omitted)).
190 See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? Market
Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 GEO. L.J. 2055, 2082 (2012) ("IP rights contribute signifi-
cantly to . . . product differentiation . ... [A]n IP right is a barrier to entry that prevents
the sort of quick and easy supply substitution that might undermine market power.").
191 Joshua D. Wright, The Antitrust/Consumer Protection Paradox: Two Policies at War with
Each Other, 121 YALE L.J. 2216, 2244 (2012) (emphasis omitted). Antitrust law is a fertile
field for exploring connections between law and entrepreneurship. See, e.g., Jonathan B.
Baker, Beyond Schumpeter v. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74 AwnTrausr LJ. 575,
587 (2007) (concluding that "competition does not just lead firms to produce more and
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Taxes, fees, and regulations of all sorts serve as barriers to entry,
and the vast literature on public choice theory demonstrates that poli-
ticians cater to established businesses at the expense of new en-
trants. 192 The popular notion of "crony capitalism" describes a system
of laws that entrenches incumbent firms and blocks entrepreneurial
action.19 3 Any legal system that wishes to promote entrepreneurial ac-
tion must employ mechanisms that constrain the inevitable pressure
to favor incumbent firms. We believe that the value of entrepreneur-
ship, sprinkled throughout the U.S. legal system, serves as a constant
reminder to legal policymakers to avoid entrenchment of incumbents.
2. Bankruptcy Laws
Willard Hurst argued that "[b]ankruptcy law began mainly as a
protection to creditors against the dishonesty of debtors," but by the
mid-nineteenth century, bankruptcy law in the U.S. "was as much to
provide means by which debtors might be saved from irretrievable
ruin and salvaged as venturers who might yet again contribute produc-
tively to the market."194 In modern legal and economic scholarship,
bankruptcy is widely regarded as an important legal tool to facilitate
entrepreneurship.195 Bankruptcy clearly limits the cost of failure asso-
ciated with entrepreneurial action.
Bankruptcy scholars have long associated a "fresh start policy"
with a desire to encourage entrepreneurship.196 Bankruptcy law may
also encourage entrepreneurship by allowing start-up businesses to at-
charge less; it encourages them to innovate as well"); Philip J. Weiser, Innovation, Entrepre-
neurship, and the Information Age, 9J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 1, 6 (2011) (contend-
ing that one role of antitrust law is to protect "disruptive entry").
192 See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L.
REv. 873, 900 (1987) (interpreting empirical evidence in support of a theory that "would
simply postulate (1) that reelection is an important motive of legislators; (2) that constitu-
ent and contributor interests thus influence legislators; and (3) that small, easily organized
interest groups have an influence disproportionate to the size of their membership").
193 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBuc, LOST: How MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS-AND
A PLAN TO STOP IT 246 (2011) ("What wins in the market is too often not what 'a free
market' would choose, but what a market bent by tariffs and subsidies and endless incum-
bency protective regulation defaults to. Call that 'crony capitalism.'").
194 HURST, supra note 17, at 26.
195 Mike W. Peng et al., Bankruptcy Laws and Entrepreneur-Friendliness, ENTREPRENEUR-
SHIP THEORY & PRAc. 517, 518 (2010); Seung-Hyun Lee et al., Bankruptcy Law and Entrepre-
neurship Development: A Real Options Perspective, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 257, 259 (2007).
196 See, e.g., Charles G. Hallinan, The "Fresh Start" Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Histor-
ical Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RicH. L. REv. 49, 64 (1986) (describing "com-
mercial risk taking" as the "chief organizing principle" of the fresh start policy); Robert A.
Hillman, Contract Excuse and Bankruptcy Discharge, 43 STAN. L. REv. 99, 125 (1990) (noting
that "discharge ... encourages beneficial, albeit risky, business activity by merchants and
manufacturers").
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tract employees.1 9 7 A strong connection between bankruptcy laws and
entrepreneurship has been supported empirically.198
One might be tempted to assume that strong limited liability pro-
tection, discussed in the next section, would substitute for bankruptcy
laws, but "creditors frequently demand personal guarantees from
owner-managers which constitute a 'contracting out' of the liability
shield incorporation otherwise gives to the entrepreneur."199 Thus,
Armour and Cumming identify two effects of bankruptcy law that are
in some tension: the "insurance effect" results in more entrepreneur-
ship because debtors are more protected against losses of exempt as-
sets, and the "credit supply effect" results in less entrepreneurship
because lenders ration credit when debtors are more protected
against losses. 200 However, the main thrust of the bankruptcy litera-
ture, both normative and empirical, is that it promotes entrepreneurs
to act by limiting their cost of failure.20
3. Limited Liability and Asset Partitioning
The concept of limited liability has existed in various forms for
hundreds of years, and the justification for it has surprisingly re-
mained the same: investors are more willing to invest in a venture if
they can be assured that the creditors of the venture will not have the
ability to take the personal assets of the investors. 202 This not only
encourages investors but also entrepreneurs themselves to engage in
transactions because they no longer have to take an "all or nothing"
197 F.H. Buckley, The Debtor as Victim, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1078, 1089 (2002) (sug-
gesting that "bankruptcy might be a particularly useful incentive device in attracting em-
ployees to work in high-risk jobs, such as start-up ventures").
198 SeeJohn Armour & Douglas Cumming, Bankruptcy Law and Entrepreneurship, 10 AM.
L. & ECON. REv. 303, 337 (2008) ("Controlling for a range of other legal, economic and
social factors that may affect national levels of entrepreneurship, we show that bankruptcy
law has a pronounced effect on levels of entrepreneurship."); Wei Fan & MichelleJ. White,
Personal Bankruptcy and the Level of Entrepreneurial Activity, 46 J.L. & ECON. 543, 543-44
(2003) (finding that bankruptcy exemptions are positively correlated with the decision to
start a business).
199 Armour & Cumming, supra note 198, at 307.
200 Id. at 305-08.
201 See Lee et al., supra note 195, at 259 (noting "the key issue is not avoiding failure
but managing the cost of failure by limiting exposure to the downside while preserving
access to attractive opportunities and maximizing gains" (citation omitted)).
202 See William J. Carney, Limited Liability, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND EcONOMICs:
THE REGULATION OF CONTRACTS 659 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000)
("The principal advantage of limited liability is in encouraging investment by passive inves-
tors in risky enterprises, particularly where these investors are poor monitors of manag-
ers."); Max Radin, The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 643, 654
(1932) ("It was found in medieval Europe that men would often decline to adventure in
business transactions unless they could so limit their liability. And this was especially the
case when those who were asked to join the enterprise had no direct control over its
management.").
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approach to starting a business.203 In the absence of limited liability,
"the supply of investment and the demand for credit might be much
smaller than they are." 2 0 4
Other variations of this investment-encouragement argument for
limited liability have found some traction as well. One author found
that when states were originally deciding to create limited liability cor-
poration statutes in the 1800s, a major justification offered by propo-
nents of such legislation was that limited liability is much more
"democratic."2 0 5 The legislators meant that limited liability offered an
opportunity for small business owners to engage in large-scale ven-
tures than they would have under an unlimited liability regime.206
This would create greater diversification for investors because now the
starting of businesses was not limited to just the wealthy-that is, those
who could personally guarantee the debts of the corporation.207
While opponents to limited liability generally agree with the basic
argument that limited liability offers opportunities for small business
owners that would not be otherwise available, they argue that limited
liability should be abolished when it comes to tort liability2 08 or when
a parent corporation seeks to limit its liability in connection with a
wholly owned subsidiary corporation.209 However, these arguments
have been countered by the general notion that limited liability en-
courages investment.210 Others have offered more attenuated
counterarguments, claiming that limited liability also reduces the
monitoring costs of doing business, which is necessary in today's busi-
ness world "where passive investors specialize in risk-bearing[ ] and
203 Richard A. Booth, Limited Liability and the Efficient Allocation ofResources, 89 Nw. U.
L. REV. 140, 158 (1994) ("The notion that a small business owner should be prevented
from planning how much capital to put at risk is so absurd that it hardly needs to be
argued down.").
204 Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV.
499, 503 (1976).
205 Stephen B. Presser, Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation: Limited Liability, Democ-
racy, and Economics, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 148, 174 (1992) ("Limited liability was legislated with
a model in mind of an entrepreneur who would directly invest in and manage a
corporation.").
206 Id. at 155-56.
207 Id.
208 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liabil-
ity for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1880 (1991) (arguing that there are "no persuasive
reasons to prefer limited liability ... for corporate torts).
209 Jonathan M. Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions
in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 589, 617-19 (1975).
210 Presser, supra note 205, at 172 ("Part of the theory of limited liability for corporate
shareholders, it would seem, is that by allowing them to externalize some of their costs, and
thus increasing the demand for corporate shares, economic development will take place
that may have synergistic effects which generate widespread benefits.").
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not monitoring of management."2 1 ' Further, limited liability allows
organizations to engage in "optimal investment decisions."212
The scholarship took a turn when Henry Hansmann and Reinier
Kraakman introduced the idea of "asset partitioning" and claimed
that limited liability is only one half, and actually the less important
half, of organizational law's facilitative function.213 Asset partitioning
is the idea that an entrepreneur may, by choosing one type of business
organization over another, move assets out of his own reach and out
of the reach of his personal creditors and into the reach of creditors
of a corporation or partnership.214 Not only is this important to re-
duce the risk of the entrepreneur and the entrepreneur's personal
creditors (which is the concept of limited liability or "defensive asset
partitioning"),215 but it also serves the purpose of reducing the risk of
the corporation's creditors. The corporation's creditors will not have
to worry about the entrepreneur's personal creditors trying to reach
the corporate assets (which is the concept of "affirmative asset parti-
tioning" or "capital lock-in"). 216
Because affirmative asset partitioning is regarded as the converse
to limited liability, its justifications are similar: it reduces the risk of
investors and encourages entrepreneurial activity and firm stability.217
For example, one of the justifications for asset partitioning is that it
increases stability in the firm by requiring partners and shareholders
not to withdraw assets before there has been an agreement to liqui-
date the firm's assets. 218 This, in turn, protects the "firm's going-con-
cern value," 2 19 which encourages investment in the firm. In sum,
limited liability and asset partitioning encourage entrepreneurial ac-
tion by reducing the cost of failure.
211 Carney, supra note 202, at 670.
212 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U.
CmI. L. REV. 89, 97 (1985) ("When investors hold diversified portfolios, managers maxi-
mize investors' welfare by investing in any project with a positive net present value. They
can accept high-variance ventures (such as the development of new products) without ex-
posing the investors to ruin. Each investor can hedge against the failure of one project by
holding stock in other firms. In a world of unlimited liability, though, managers would
behave differently. They would reject as 'too risky' some projects with positive net present
values. Investors would want them to do this because it would be the best way to reduce
risks. By definition this would be a social loss, because projects with a positive net present
value are beneficial uses of capital.").
213 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110
YALE L.J. 387, 390 (2000).
214 Giacomo Rojas Elgueta, Divergences and Convergences of Common Law and Civil Law
Traditions on Asset Partitioning: A Functional Analysis, 12 U. PA.J. Bus. L. 517, 519-20 (2010).
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Henry Hansmann et al., Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARv. L. REv. 1335,
1343-50 (2006).
218 Id.
219 Id. at 1350.
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CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have claimed that a legal system, in a macro
sense, is crucial to entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurial opportunities
lie at the very heart of entrepreneurship, and a legal system that en-
hances the benefits of success and mitigates the costs of failure for
entrepreneurs encourages entrepreneurs to experiment with existing
resources to create new opportunities. When entrepreneurs exploit
those opportunities, they produce new resources for the next genera-
tion of entrepreneurs to use in creating new entrepreneurial opportu-
nities. This "opportunity cycle" leads to a self-perpetuating
entrepreneurial society.
A well-known story involving Jeff Bezos and Amazon.com illus-
trates our thesis well. While working as a senior vice president for a
Wall Street investment firm in the early 1990s, Jeff Bezos learned of a
United States Supreme Court decision holding that a mail-order busi-
ness could not be subject to sales tax in a state where the business had
no physical presence.220 Bezos had been researching Internet busi-
ness opportunities as part of his work for the hedge fund D.E. Shaw &
Co., 2 2 1 but when Bezos proposed that the firm pursue online booksell-
ing, the chief executive officer refused.222 Bezos left the firm, drove
across the country to Seattle, Washington, and founded Amazon.com
in the garage of his rental home.223
Amazon.com was not the first Internet retailer 224-or even the
first Internet bookseller 225-but Bezos was willing to compete by low-
ering margins.22 6 He hired two experienced computer program-
mers,227 invested over $50,000 of his own money, and provided
220 See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311-12 (1992) (endorsing the physi-
cal-presence test under the Commerce Clause as established in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v.
Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753 (1967)).
221 See ROBERT SPECrOR, AMAZON.COM: GET Bic FAST 16-22 (2000).
222 Id. at 30.
223 Bezos had no prior connection to Seattle, but he wanted to base his company in a
location with a large pool of technical talent, a relatively small population (because re-
sidents of the state would be charged sales tax on their purchases from the new company),
and close proximity to a major book wholesaler. Id. at 33. Originally formed as a Washing-
ton corporation under the name "Cadabra, Inc.," the company was reincorporated in Dela-
ware with the name "Amazon.com, Inc." prior to the launch in 1995. Id. at 36.
224 Peapod, an online grocery delivery service, was founded in 1989 and claims to be
"the world's first e-commerce-only company." Our Company, PEAPOD, http://www.peapod.
com/site/companyPages/our-company-overviewjsp (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
225 See SPECTOR, supra note 221, at 21-22 (identifying Computer Literacy as the first
Internet bookseller and BookStacks Unlimited and Wordsworth as two other early entrants
into this particular line of business).
226 See Adam Lashinsky, Amazon'sjeffBezos: The Ultimate Disrupter, CNNMONEY (Nov. 16,
2012, 5:00 AM), http://management.fortune.cnn.com/2012/11/16/jeff-bezos-amazon/
(reporting that a "favorite Bezos aphorism is '[y]our margin is my opportunity'").
227 SPECTOR, supra note 221, at 39-42.
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personal credit guarantees to get the firm off the ground.228 Ama-
zon.com eventually took additional investments from angel inves-
torS2 2 9 and venture capitalistS23 0 before completing an initial public
offering of common stock in 1997.231
Despite occasional bumps in the road, Amazon.com has been a
spectacular success story. The entrepreneurial opportunity created by
Jeff Bezos and the early employees of Amazon.com assembled many
existing resources: the Internet, experienced computer programmers,
books (the product), the corporate form, and financial capital, among
other things. The exploitation of that opportunity has led to the de-
velopment of additional resources-an online reviewer community,232
the prioritization and clustering of reviews,233 the associates pro-
gram,23 4 the Wish List,235 and the controversial one-click patent 236-
that have allowed Amazon.com to expand beyond books into toys,
electronics, tools, and other product categories, 237 and to serve as a
model for many other Internet retailers. The company now describes
itself in the most expansive terms: "We seek to be Earth's most cus-
tomer-centric company for four primary customer sets: consumers,
sellers, enterprises, and content creators."238
Surely most of the credit for this success and these innovations
belongs to the hard work of Bezos and his team, but we believe an
assist should be awarded to the U.S. legal system, which facilitated this
entrepreneurial action.239 In making his decision to leave Wall Street,
Bezos focused on the immense upside of the opportunity and the lim-
228 Id. at 62.
229 Id. (accepting an investment from his father, Miguel Bezos).
230 Id. at 99-103 (accepting an investment from the venture capital firm Kleiner Per-
kins Caufield & Byers).
231 SeeAmazon.com Inc., Prospectus (Form 424(b) (1)), at 4 (May 15, 1997), available
at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1018724/0000891020-97-000868.txt.
232 This feature of the site was described in the company's first prospectus. See id. at
30-31.
233 See RAMON CASADESUS-MASANELL & ANANT THAKER, HARVARD Bus. SCH., CASE STUDY
712405, EBAY, INC. AND AMAZON.COM (A) 4 (2012).
234 SeeAmazon.com, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 7 (Mar. 29, 2000), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1018724/0000891020-00-000622.txt (describ-
ing the Associates Program, which "enables associated Web sites to make products available
to their audiences with order fulfillment by Amazon.com").
235 See id. at 6 (describing the Wish List as a feature that "allows users to create an
online wish list of desired products and services that others can reference for gift-giving
purposes").
236 U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (filed Sept. 12, 1997). The Patent and Trademark Office
ordered a reexamination of this patent but confirmed its patentability after minor adjust-
ments. See Reexamination Certificate, U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (issued July 13, 2010).
237 CASADESUS-MASANELL & THAKER, supra note 233, at 4.
238 Amazon Investor Relations, AMAZON.COM, http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.
zhtml?c=97664&p=irol-irhome (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
239 Although we have drawn attention to the startup process by focusing on Ama-
zon.com, the opportunity cycle is not limited to startup companies. For example, one can
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ited downside.240 By assuring Bezos that he could retain many of the
benefits of his success while reducing the costs associated with failure,
the legal system emboldened his action.
By contrast, the Introduction to this Article recounted entrepre-
neur Alexander Blakely's glee with the nonlegal society he found in
postcommunist Siberia. As we saw, however, Blakely's glee was short
lived, and he left Siberia after only five years. Blakely admits that his
business prospects were largely dependent on bribes, 24' and we be-
lieve that his entrepreneurial opportunities were limited by the ab-
sence of law. Just as Bezos' successful creation and exploitation of the
Amazon.com opportunity owes an assist to the U.S. legal system,
Blakely's failure in Siberia owes an assist to the absence of a legal sys-
tem that could promote legitimate entrepreneurial action.
easily perceive the opportunity cycle in the development of the Apple iPod. See WALTER
ISAACSON, STEVE JOBS: A BIOGRAPHY 406 (2011).
240 SPECTOR, supra note 221, at 30-31.
241 See supra text accompanying note 4.
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